One small, if interesting, side
effect of what is unfolding now in Tehran is that I had to rewrite my paper up
to the last moment. We already know that things will never be the same in Iran
after the 15th of June. But in the wake of these events, could the Iranian
nuclear negotiation go trough dramatic changes? In the best case, which is yet
far from sure, that is with the arrival of somewhat different teams at the
table of negotiation, certainly the atmosphere could change, things could go
faster and easier. But basics won't change.
What will not change, for
instance, is the pride of the Iranian people for having been able to develop on
their soil a technology, enrichment, which the most advanced nations seemed to
keep jealously for themselves. So there is no more hope than before to convince
people in charge in Tehran, whoever they are, to accept the "zero
centrifuge" formula than the Europeans, and the Americans, have tried for
several years to impose on the Iranians.
What will not change either are
the laws of physics, and therefore the quantity of enriched uranium or
plutonium necessary to induce an explosion. Nor international law, nor the
obligations of NPT parties including Iran, nor the elaborate methods of
inspections and controls developed over more than four decades by the IAEA to
safeguard the peaceful uses of atomic energy.
A small parenthesis, at this
stage, over my own experience.
As French ambassador to Iran
from 2001 to 2005, I was immersed in this nuclear negotiation. And, luckily, I
had served previously for several years in my Ministry in the department in
charge of non-proliferation. I was also at a time deputy secretary to the
French minister of defence. Thank to this expertise, I felt quite at ease with
the issue. But there was a setback. My knowledge of the subject drove me to
develop convictions which came sometimes at variance with the line I had to
defend. So part of my problems were with people on my own side. I left
diplomacy in 2005, and it took me no time to avail myself of the delicious
freedom of speech. It should then be clear that I express myself today as a
free and independent person.
Let us go back to the heart of
the nuclear file. In the new phase that will open, if only because of the new
American attitude, we will not start from scratch. One should always remember
that the Iranians, since the beginning of the crisis, even after the arrival of
Ahmadinejad, never thought of expelling the IAEA inspectors, never withdrew
from NPT. When the IAEA inspections put to light in 2003 undeclared activities
of enrichment, though limited in size, they could have reacted like the North
Koreans. They had tried to cover up this activity, but discovered to their own
amazement the efficiency of the IAEA methods, which could, with small
environmental samples : air, soil, water, leaves... detect, even on an empty
site, the presence at atomic level of tale-telling particles of human-made
enriched uranium. Whatever their public humiliation at the time, the Iranians
chose to remain within the IAEA safeguards system, and have not changed their
mind since. This is why we can still collect so much information on the
development of the Iranian nuclear program, simply by reading the IAEA reports.
So there is a base of goodwill on which it is possible to build.
Let me jump over many episodes
and summarize the situation as follows.
After many crises, failures and
stand-byes, both sides, to come out of the present impasse, have to accept that
the Iranian nuclear program, in terms of its NPT commitments, is still
ambiguous, is still at a kind of crossroads. Listening to the Iranians, this
program will go civilian and peaceful, but we cannot be sure of that as long as
do not exist and operate the Iranian nuclear power plants which would give its
meaning to the Natanz enrichment plant. The other track may very well be
military and explosive, but we are not sure yet and won't be sure as long as we
do not see the characteristic signals of excursions into high level
enrichments, or the preparation of some explosive test. If both parties can
agree to recognize this ambiguity, it will become possible to resolve it, of
course for the better, by giving substance and credibility to the civilian and
peaceful dimension of the Iranian nuclear program.
Here I would like to quote part
of the recent press conference of President Obama in France, which has caught
little public attention. What did President Obama say in the French city of
Caen?
«The last point I'd make on
Iran, the Supreme Leader has said "We don't want nuclear weapons; that's
not what we're pursuing". I'm happy to hope that that's true, but in
international relations I can't just base things on hope, especially when you
see actions to the contrary. One of my famous predecessors, Ronald Reagan, said
it pretty well when he said, "Trust, but verify." ...Ultimately, if
in fact Iran does not seek nuclear weapons, then it shouldn't be that hard for
us to have a series of negotiations in which the international community feels
that confidence, and in which Iran then is able to enjoy a whole host of
economic and political benefits..."
I agree 100% with this motto
"trust but verify". We may have, or not, nicer guys facing us
tomorrow, but a day will come with other leaders and situations that we cannot
think of today. This is where the long lasting, sophisticated and impartial
IAEA system of control is of critical help. Let us remember, by the way, that
up to now no country under full-scope IAEA safeguards has ever been able to
come close to produce and explode, undetected, a nuclear device : neither
Saddam, nor North Korea. Of course the IAEA could not stop North Korea or even
Saddam, but this is not its role, this is the role of willing Nations.
"Trust but verify..."
Let us see how the formula could apply to the Iranian case.
First, we should be careful not
to ask for commitments which cannot be easily verified. This is why asking Iran
to commit itself to "zero centrifuge", however politically rewarding
and easy to sell to the public, has no practical value since nobody will be
able to ascertain that Iran will not run someday, somewhere, on its vast
territory, in an underground facility, a few dozen clandestine centrifuges. But
you don't build a nuclear arsenal with a few dozen centrifuges.
The alarm system to surround
Iranian activities should be drawn elsewhere. There are in fact a few simple
commitments which would allow us to react in safe time to any attempt from this
regime or any other Iranian regime to build a nuclear device.
The first of them would be, or
course, for Iran to ratify and to implement the Additional protocol, offering
the IAEA inspectors a wider capacity of controls. But this is not enough.
Concerning more specifically the Iranian enrichment capacity, on which focuses,
with good reason, the world attention,
· Iran could and should formally
confirm its intention, already expressed, not to enrich uranium beyond 5%,
· it could and should accept to
keep, as today, all its enrichment activities on one site and one only, in
order to facilitate inspections,
· it should also accept to
maintain the output of its upstream uranium cycle - mining, production of
yellow cake, conversion, enrichment, fuel manufacturing -, at a level
consistent with the actual need of fuel of its nuclear power program, still at
a very early phase,
· finally, it should agree to
immediately incorporate into fuel components for power plants the uranium
enriched at Natanz. In such form and conditioning, diversion to clandestine
uses becomes much more difficult. IAEA controls on the Iranian stock of low
enriched uranium would be made safer and easier.
I shall stop here not to become
too technical.
In conclusion, I firmly believe
that with the proper approach, the Iranians, whoever they are, can be brought
to accept such commitments and others of the same venue. And the most valuable
gift which we could give them in exchange would be the assurance that the
faithful implementation of such commitments would open for them the door of the
community of advanced and respectable nuclear nations. Gaining respect from the
outer world is still something very important the Iranian population and even
for the regime, even for somebody like Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and even more so for
the people who could succeed him.
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