Iran’s Interests and Concerns : How Can They be Met? (Wilton Park, November, 2009)

I have not chosen the subject of our early afternoon meeting, but am quite happy with it, as I believe that the worst criminal has a right to have a defender. It should also be the case for the Iranian regime. I shall play this role for about twenty minutes, but please at the end of it don't hang the lawyer with the culprit. Beyond this somewhat legalistic approach, when one enters into a negotiation and when one addresses someone hoping to make him move in one's own direction, one has first to understand him in all his complexity, to assimilate his own history.  This is true even in a conflict: to be able to forecast the movements of the adversary, it is essential to put oneself in his own mind. So whatever the motive: dialogue, engagement, diplomacy, or confrontation and even open use of force, one has to make the effort to understand the Iranians, and particularly, the people in charge, the people of the Regime.  After that, we will make up  our own judgement, and act accordingly.

In their relationship with the outer world, and especially the West, the Regime's state of mind, but also the minds of many Iranians who have no special links with the Regime, are shaped by a series of facts, some in the long range of history, some in a somewhat medium range, starting with the birth of the Islamic Republic, some in the short range, linked, more or less, with the American intervention in Iraq and the rise of the nuclear crisis.

Starting with the long range approach, one has first to remember that the Iranians are deeply convinced that their country is the eternal victim of external, aggressive powers. Since the fall of the Achaemenid Empire under the sword of Alexander, the Iranian territory has very seldom been a point of departure for conquests. Over two thousand years, all dynasties, except two or three at most, were founded by invaders, mostly of Turkish origin.  It is true that the last Pahlavi dynasty was founded by an Iranian, a non-commissioned officer in the Cossack Guard of the Shah but his son, Mohammad Reza, who was raised in Switzerland, was considered by the population as overly westernized, and nicknamed "the Tourist".  One thing that one cannot blame on the present Regime, is not to be grass-rooted Iranian.  As it is, with all its shortcomings and even all its crimes, it stems from the Iranian people, it is deeply entrenched in the Iranian reality.

Since the mid-19th century, when the Qajar dynasty tried to conquer the neighbouring city of Herat and failed miserably, the Iranians have led no expedition out of their frontiers except for the intervention of Iranian troops in Oman in the early seventies to help Sultan Qabous crush a communist upheaval in the western region of Dhufar. On the contrary, Iran has been invaded regularly and in particular despoiled in the 19th century by the Russians, through wars and uneven treaties, of what is today Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan.

At the turn of the 20th Century, Iran was divided into two spheres of influence by an Anglo-Russian agreement and occupied by foreign troops. This was the time when the Russian military supported the autocratic Shah against the Constitutionalist movement, shooting on crowds and using artillery fire against the sacred Shrine of Mashhad. Like China a little earlier, this was a time when Iran was in deadly danger of disappearing from the map as a united and independent nation. Like in the Chinese case, the one nation which pleaded at the time in favour of sparing Iran was the United States. During the Second World War, Iran was again occupied by the Russians and the British, and Stalin evacuated only very reluctantly the occupied region of Azerbaijan after the end of the war. Of course, the last aggression against Iranian territory was Saddam's in 1980, obviously encouraged by the West and the Arab world, leading to an eight year war.

Another episode vividly remembered by the population as another blow against Iran's pride and independence was the 1953 Coup against Mossadegh which was, as we all know today with the opening of diplomatic archives, instrumented by the CIA and MI6. One has to look back at this episode to fully understand the meaning of the takeover of the American Embassy in Tehran in November 1979, followed by the hostage taking of 52 American personnel of the Embassy for 444 very long days. This was of course horrible behaviour, contrary to all diplomatic and even humanitarian rules, but the Iranian population had a vivid memory of the American Embassy building being the headquarters of the anti-Mossadegh coup. There was a widespread fear that it could be used again for a similar endeavour, taking advantage of the general anarchy reigning in Iran at the beginning of the Revolution.  This is how the takeover of the American Embassy became in the Iranian psyche a symbol similar to the Prise de la Bastille even if many regret today the following episode of hostage-taking.

Of course, during the Iraq-Iran war, the Iranians had the feeling that the whole world, except China and Syria, was in league against them and in support of Saddam.  Iraq was not condemned in the United Nations for its aggression. Russia and France were heavy providers of weaponry to Iraq while the Gulf Arab countries were financing the war. There was no significant reaction either from human rights loving countries against the military use of deadly gas by Saddam.  On the 3rd of July, 1988 the Americans finally broke the backbone of Iranian resilience by shooting down over Iranian territorial waters an Iranian civilian airplane, killing its 290 passengers and crew members.  Certainly unwilling, but the damage was done.

Let us come to the nuclear crisis again from the Iranian point of view. The Regime is still unable today to confess that it led for about two decades a clandestine military nuclear program.  That is, though, easy to explain, if not to accept, as everybody knew at the time that Saddam had already started some years ago on the same track and it was unthinkable for the Iranians to remain idle. After some hesitation, they endorsed also the civilian nuclear program of the Shah, first to spare their most precious source of foreign currency, second to prepare for the post-petrol era, third (and perhaps even first) to position themselves on the world stage as a significant player in a major field of modernity. With of course, as a side-benefit from the technologies acquired in the process, the capacity to produce a nuclear device in a fairly short time : let us say in two or three years rather than one or two decades, should new contingencies arise in the region such as the coming of a Son of Saddam. But this is a reasoning partaken mutatis mutandis by other countries such as Japan or Brazil and nothing in international law or in the NPT forbids it as long as it remains locked in the field of speculation.

The Islamic Republic entered into this venture with serious doubts about the help they could receive from the West.  The Shah, already preoccupied by the autonomy of his nuclear enterprise, believed he had secured for his electro-nuclear program a safe provision of fuel of low-enriched uranium by buying shares of the French Eurodif enrichment plant, and offering a one billion dollar loan. But France, quite understandably, refused to deliver any load of low enriched uranium to Khomeyni's Iran. It refused also for many years to refund the loan.

At the beginning of the Iraq-Iran war, the German contract for the construction of two electro-nuclear units at Bushehr, which were pretty well advanced, at least for the main structure, stopped, of course. It is interesting to note that the site was bombed eight times by Iraqi aircraft, the last time being on the 19th of July 1988, one day after Iran declared that it finally accepted the UN-sponsored long-standing cease-fire proposal. Such a focus on this target, uncompleted at the time and therefore of no strategic interest, gives vent to questions about advice being passed from abroad to Saddam Hussein. Who was so interested in nipping in the bud Iran's civilian nuclear program?

But the Iranians did not get discouraged. After the end of the war they asked the Germans to rebuild the plant but the Germans refused. After looking around a lot, the Iranians finally signed in 1995 an agreement with Russia to rebuild the first unit of Bushehr and the contract foresaw completion of the plant by 2001. As for today Bushehr has not yet started producing electricity, which is another disappointment for the Iranians.

Let us come to the 2002 crisis and the discovery of the Natanz enrichment unit. The Iranian enrichment program has been, quite rightly, the focus of all the worries of the world as it opens the possibility to produce the material for a bomb as well as fuel for legitimate nuclear power plants. And for the moment nobody can see or even foresee the nuclear power plants which could make use of the Natanz production. The Russians of course insist on the fact that they will feed the Bushehr plant with Russian-produced fuel so serious doubts arise about the real motive of such a project.

The Iranians answer that the outside world and especially the West, by trying to discourage them from acquiring this specific technology, pursues in fact a triple goal: not only cutting the road to the bomb as it claims, but also keeping a permanent possibility of blackmailing Iran by refusing to deliver the necessary fuel, be it for Bushehr or for future power plants, and finally protecting its own technological advance. From the Eurodif as well as from the Bushehr experience, Iran has learned the hard way that it could not trust the Russians or the West and it claims that it has developed the Natanz unit, not to feed Bushehr and all its future nuclear power plants, but to put together a safety stock of fuel in case of unexpected disruption of fuel delivery. It is true that the nuclear plants supposed eventually to absorb the Natanz production do not yet exist, giving vent to the suspicion of military end use, but this is not the fault of Iran if the completion of Bushehr has already been delayed by nine years and if the Western builders of electro-nuclear plants have steadfastly refused considering selling such plants to Iran. Had Bushehr, in particular, been completed in due time by the Russians, the Natanz enrichment plant would have taken immediately all its significance but in the long run, Natanz will gain its whole legitimacy. Of course, add the Iranians, no international treaty, and certainly not the NPT, forbids the development of the enrichment technology. The Security Council by presenting such an activity as a threat to peace in order to activate Chapter 7 of the UN Charter and impose sanctions on Iran has acted unlawfully.

If I can insert here a personal testimony, I would like to tell my conviction that the Natanz plant was never intended to be something clandestine. It was built in the desert, in the open, easily visible by any commercial satellite along a road leading to a tourist landmark and I remember very well passing several times with my diplomatic car along the construction site which had no special protection.

All of this is to say that if the West rightfully distrusts Iran and abhors its international provocative behaviour, not speaking of its handling of human rights, Iran has developed some reasons to distrust the West. The way the West up to now has led its relationship with Iran has done nothing to dissipate this solid distrust. One has to say in particular that the openly proclaimed carrot and stick policy has been absolutely disastrous and is still producing disasters because no one can command a donkey by agitating simultaneously a stick and a carrot as we have done consistently. This is on the contrary the best way to turn the poor animal crazy.  When one extends the carrot one should keep the stick behind one's back.  Everybody knows that the stick is there, there is no reason to insist by showing it. It is only when the carrot has been consistently disdained that one can agitate and even use the stick.  All of this is elementary animal psychology and even if the Iranians do not have diplomacy as bright and subtle as we tend to believe, they are no donkeys either.  Like everybody else, they want to be respected and treated on an equal footing. When the West will have understood this, the very deep layer of distrust accumulated in Iran could perhaps start to dissipate, offering new openings for our relationship with this difficult and intriguing country.

"Trust but Verify", NIAC symposium in Washington DC (June, 2009)

One small, if interesting, side effect of what is unfolding now in Tehran is that I had to rewrite my paper up to the last moment. We already know that things will never be the same in Iran after the 15th of June. But in the wake of these events, could the Iranian nuclear negotiation go trough dramatic changes? In the best case, which is yet far from sure, that is with the arrival of somewhat different teams at the table of negotiation, certainly the atmosphere could change, things could go faster and easier. But basics won't change.

What will not change, for instance, is the pride of the Iranian people for having been able to develop on their soil a technology, enrichment, which the most advanced nations seemed to keep jealously for themselves. So there is no more hope than before to convince people in charge in Tehran, whoever they are, to accept the "zero centrifuge" formula than the Europeans, and the Americans, have tried for several years to impose on the Iranians.

What will not change either are the laws of physics, and therefore the quantity of enriched uranium or plutonium necessary to induce an explosion. Nor international law, nor the obligations of NPT parties including Iran, nor the elaborate methods of inspections and controls developed over more than four decades by the IAEA to safeguard the peaceful uses of atomic energy.

A small parenthesis, at this stage, over my own experience.

As French ambassador to Iran from 2001 to 2005, I was immersed in this nuclear negotiation. And, luckily, I had served previously for several years in my Ministry in the department in charge of non-proliferation. I was also at a time deputy secretary to the French minister of defence. Thank to this expertise, I felt quite at ease with the issue. But there was a setback. My knowledge of the subject drove me to develop convictions which came sometimes at variance with the line I had to defend. So part of my problems were with people on my own side. I left diplomacy in 2005, and it took me no time to avail myself of the delicious freedom of speech. It should then be clear that I express myself today as a free and independent person.

Let us go back to the heart of the nuclear file. In the new phase that will open, if only because of the new American attitude, we will not start from scratch. One should always remember that the Iranians, since the beginning of the crisis, even after the arrival of Ahmadinejad, never thought of expelling the IAEA inspectors, never withdrew from NPT. When the IAEA inspections put to light in 2003 undeclared activities of enrichment, though limited in size, they could have reacted like the North Koreans. They had tried to cover up this activity, but discovered to their own amazement the efficiency of the IAEA methods, which could, with small environmental samples : air, soil, water, leaves... detect, even on an empty site, the presence at atomic level of tale-telling particles of human-made enriched uranium. Whatever their public humiliation at the time, the Iranians chose to remain within the IAEA safeguards system, and have not changed their mind since. This is why we can still collect so much information on the development of the Iranian nuclear program, simply by reading the IAEA reports. So there is a base of goodwill on which it is possible to build.

Let me jump over many episodes and summarize the situation as follows.

After many crises, failures and stand-byes, both sides, to come out of the present impasse, have to accept that the Iranian nuclear program, in terms of its NPT commitments, is still ambiguous, is still at a kind of crossroads. Listening to the Iranians, this program will go civilian and peaceful, but we cannot be sure of that as long as do not exist and operate the Iranian nuclear power plants which would give its meaning to the Natanz enrichment plant. The other track may very well be military and explosive, but we are not sure yet and won't be sure as long as we do not see the characteristic signals of excursions into high level enrichments, or the preparation of some explosive test. If both parties can agree to recognize this ambiguity, it will become possible to resolve it, of course for the better, by giving substance and credibility to the civilian and peaceful dimension of the Iranian nuclear program.

Here I would like to quote part of the recent press conference of President Obama in France, which has caught little public attention. What did President Obama say in the French city of Caen?

«The last point I'd make on Iran, the Supreme Leader has said "We don't want nuclear weapons; that's not what we're pursuing".  I'm happy to hope that that's true, but in international relations I can't just base things on hope, especially when you see actions to the contrary. One of my famous predecessors, Ronald Reagan, said it pretty well when he said, "Trust, but verify." ...Ultimately, if in fact Iran does not seek nuclear weapons, then it shouldn't be that hard for us to have a series of negotiations in which the international community feels that confidence, and in which Iran then is able to enjoy a whole host of economic and political benefits..."

I agree 100% with this motto "trust but verify". We may have, or not, nicer guys facing us tomorrow, but a day will come with other leaders and situations that we cannot think of today. This is where the long lasting, sophisticated and impartial IAEA system of control is of critical help. Let us remember, by the way, that up to now no country under full-scope IAEA safeguards has ever been able to come close to produce and explode, undetected, a nuclear device : neither Saddam, nor North Korea. Of course the IAEA could not stop North Korea or even Saddam, but this is not its role, this is the role of willing Nations.

"Trust but verify..." Let us see how the formula could apply to the Iranian case.

First, we should be careful not to ask for commitments which cannot be easily verified. This is why asking Iran to commit itself to "zero centrifuge", however politically rewarding and easy to sell to the public, has no practical value since nobody will be able to ascertain that Iran will not run someday, somewhere, on its vast territory, in an underground facility, a few dozen clandestine centrifuges. But you don't build a nuclear arsenal with a few dozen centrifuges.

The alarm system to surround Iranian activities should be drawn elsewhere. There are in fact a few simple commitments which would allow us to react in safe time to any attempt from this regime or any other Iranian regime to build a nuclear device.

The first of them would be, or course, for Iran to ratify and to implement the Additional protocol, offering the IAEA inspectors a wider capacity of controls. But this is not enough. Concerning more specifically the Iranian enrichment capacity, on which focuses, with good reason, the world attention,

·                     Iran could and should formally confirm its intention, already expressed, not to enrich uranium beyond 5%,

·                     it could and should accept to keep, as today, all its enrichment activities on one site and one only, in order to facilitate inspections,

·                     it should also accept to maintain the output of its upstream uranium cycle - mining, production of yellow cake, conversion, enrichment, fuel manufacturing -, at a level consistent with the actual need of fuel of its nuclear power program, still at a very early phase,

·                     finally, it should agree to immediately incorporate into fuel components for power plants the uranium enriched at Natanz. In such form and conditioning, diversion to clandestine uses becomes much more difficult. IAEA controls on the Iranian stock of low enriched uranium would be made safer and easier.

I shall stop here not to become too technical.

In conclusion, I firmly believe that with the proper approach, the Iranians, whoever they are, can be brought to accept such commitments and others of the same venue. And the most valuable gift which we could give them in exchange would be the assurance that the faithful implementation of such commitments would open for them the door of the community of advanced and respectable nuclear nations. Gaining respect from the outer world is still something very important the Iranian population and even for the regime, even for somebody like Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and even more so for the people who could succeed him.

Interview with Borzou Daraghi for the Los Angeles Times (May, 2009)

Los Angeles Times: The talk in the U.S. media now is about a deadline that some people in the administration are saying is going to be imposed on talks with Iran.  What do you think of that?

Francois Nicoullaud:  What I think sincerely is that the solution of the Iranian nuclear file is fairly simple technically.  So the basics of such a solution could be put together quite fast.  In fact, a two or three months' span of time would be perfectly feasible, if on both sides, especially on the Western side, people seriously dedicate themselves to the task. This means that the western side should, like the Iranians, appoint full time negotiators— not part time negotiators as was done in the past.

I believe we can see in three months if we have a good chance to reach a solution or not.  At a moment, people spoke of October but such a time table has been wisely abandoned. People in Iran are presently busy with the incoming presidential elections. Perhaps there will be two rounds, this brings them to July. In August nothing happens in Iran.  And by the way, the new presidential mandate will start in September.  If the negotiation starts in September, very substantial progress by the end of the year can very well be a realistic goal.

Borzou Daragahi:     Do you think that Iran will suspend its enrichment of uranium?

Francois Nicoullaud:  No, I do not think so.  Frankly, nobody in Iran, even under another president, will dare to suspend the production of enriched uranium. It has become too strung with symbols, and therefore politically too risky.

But what would be perhaps attainable is that, in some unspoken, unofficial way, the production could slow down and go at a leisurely space. With no operating nuclear power plant yet, the Iranians have no reason to be in a hurry for the completion of their enrichment program. Other discreet gestures of goodwill could show that the Iranians will not take advantage of the negotiation to rush towards the production of highly enriched uranium.

Borzou Daragahi:     Do you think that this would be acceptable to Europe?

Francois Nicoullaud:  Europe which up to now has been quite adamant on suspension will most probably follow the American administration if it decides to give a try to a short negotiation with no prerequisite like suspension of enrichment. Though, some people in Europe are not enthusiastic, to say the least, about the prospect of a concession on this point.

Borzou Daragahi: If there is no suspension, and Iranian continues to enrich uranium at low levels to maintain this nuclear ambiguity indefinitely, is that tolerable, that they become a virtual nuclear power as Mohammed El-Baradei calls it?

Francois Nicoullaud:  No, I don’t think it is tolerable to go on living in ambiguity. I believe that with reinforced controls, with some basic rules, some clear-cut commitments from Iran, it is very possible for this country to continue producing low enriched uranium without any ambiguity.  With such checks and controls, it would be clear that low enriched uranium could not be diverted to be further enriched for military use, at least without the international community being aware of it in ample time before entering the danger zone. 

Borzou Daragahi : If you were going to advise let us say Dennis Ross and his people, what would advise them about dealing with the Iranians?  How would you characterize dealing with Iranian officials and negotiators?

Francois Nicoullaud:  I believe that it is very important, and this has never been done before, to have a team of full time negotiators.  Not a kind of envoy to Middle East dealing with too many other problems.

The Iranians are ready I’m sure to put full time negotiators on the other side of the table and one should be able to do the same.  Finally, the chief negotiator should be a good technician on nuclear matters, or be surrounded by good experts because the heart of the negotiation is technical.

Second point, one has to understand and accept Iranians' insistence to put visibly the negotiation on an equal footing. And from there, we have to create confidence. I don’t mean confidence in Iranian final intentions, this is another matter, I mean personal trust between the people around the table. This is possible with enough care and attention. Once this done, things could go pretty fast. 

As for the heart of the matter, the basic question should be to see if it is feasible to safely control the Iranian nuclear program, especially its enrichment program, in order to avoid any diversion towards a military program. Respected nuclear experts believe that it is possible. For instance, the Iranians have said in the past that they were ready not to enrich uranium beyond 5% and I believe that this commitment could still stand. Of course, in itself, that’s not enough.  But it is a start. The goal would be to build around the enrichment activity a safe fence of checks and controls. If one comes close to the fence and touches it, one of its many little bells is bound to ring, meaning that something wrong is happening.  Thus, one of the bells would be a ceiling of 5% for enrichment.

Of course, the foundation of the fence would be the ratification and implementation by Iran of the so-called Additional Protocol to replace its present antiquated safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency. This is the prerequisite for a better set of controls.

 It should possible to convince the Iranians to accept such a new set of rules, if we explain to them that this is the unavoidable entrance fee to the club of legitimate, respectable, nuclear nations. Iran is interested in belonging to such a club, and being a part of the Additional Protocol is certainly one of the club’s basic rules. All the countries negotiating with Iran have ratified the Additional Protocol. So they are not asking Iran to do something that they have not accepted themselves.

Another guaranty would be not to keep the low enriched uranium produced in Natanz in its gaseous or liquid state but to transform it as soon as possible into oxide pellets, to be introduced into the fuel rods used in nuclear power plants. In such a form, uranium is of course much easier to control.

And of course, there should be some relation between the amount of low enriched uranium produced by Iran and the actual needs of its nuclear power plants. As long as Iran does not possess at least two or three active nuclear power plants, there is no use having an enrichment unit of 50,000 centrifuges, as announced by the Iranian President.

Borzou Daragahi: Do you think that kind of scenario that you are setting up would be acceptable to Israel?

Francois Nicoullaud:  Israel has already accepted the principle of a short term, intense negotiation. And I believe that this scenario is acceptable to people who want in good faith to be reassured that Iran cannot produce a nuclear bomb without being exposed to the World at the very outset of such a venture. What would happen in such a case, how to stop the infringer of the rule, is a matter of will power of the international community. But what people are not sufficiently aware of is that the IAEA controls work, and that with a good set of rules, the offender cannot escape being uncovered.

Perhaps the Israelis won’t be very happy if the negotiation builds up along such a track, but it would be difficult for them to launch a strike if the international community, the US, Europe etc. is on the way of a compromise with the Iranians. Israel would take an enormous political risk, on top of the practical risks of such a complex intervention.

Borzou Daragahi: There was this window of opportunity from 2003 to 2005 when Iran suspended its uranium enrichment but then restarted. What lessons can we draw from that experience if any?

Francois Nicoullaud:  one basic mistake on the side of the West, of the Europeans, was to think that we could seduce Iran with carrots. The Europeans tried to put together some kind of package containing civilian planes, oil drilling equipments, power plants, economic cooperation, membership to the World Trade Organization... But the package could not take form as long as the Americans were not ready to lift their economic sanctions.  And furthermore, it was basically a wrong approach to reward Iran for not trying to produce a nuclear bomb. Being a member of NPT, it is Iran's simple duty to remain away from such an endeavour. So we created a sort of bazaar atmosphere which was very detrimental to the negotiation. It could end nowhere.

The correct approach would to define clearly the rights and duties of Iran in the use of nuclear energy and to have Iran agree to both of them. And again the best reward for fulfilling its duties would be to be admitted in due time as a full-fledged member of the community of respectable nuclear nations. And for the Iranians, it is very important to be treated and considered as a respectable nation.

Borzou Daragahi: Do you think that the Obama administration is doing well so far in terms of dealing with Iran?

Francois Nicoullaud:  Obviously it still has to build a united approach, and this is quite natural for a young administration. Discussions are going on, and one can see progress.  I guess that the Americans will be ready intellectually to negotiate by the end of the summer.  So the critical period will be October, November, December 2009.

Borzou Daragahi: Do you think that the US is ready to forgive and forget 30 years of hostility with Iran and welcome it into the fold—to consider Iran just another country?

Francois Nicoullaud: The Americans have apologized already for the wrongdoings of the past, especially for the CIA coup against Mossadegh.  The difficulty for the Iranians to apologize for their own wrongdoings, namely the American hostages’ episode, comes for the fact that the takeover of the American Embassy has built up as a founding myth of the Islamic Revolution, resembling the storming of the Bastille at the beginning of the French Revolution. But I certainly believe that the Iranians, apart from the political meaning of the event, could, and should express, on humane grounds, their regrets and sympathy for the personal sufferings inflicted on the American hostages. Many of them already do it in private.

Borzou Daragahi: Do you think they are ready to give up on ‘death to America, death to Israel,” pillars of the revolution?

Francois Nicoullaud:  That also will come in time.  There should be a step-by-step approach. I believe the nuclear issue is the easiest one to solve of all the problems that the West has with Iran precisely because of its scientific and technical nature. It is much easier to verify the application of an agreement built on technical checks, controls and inspections than an agreement touching on the ways and means of Iran in the region, be it in Israel, Palestine, Lebanon, Iraq or Afghanistan.

If Iran accepts to not to enrich beyond 5%, and enriches at 6%, a few weeks later everybody  will know, thanks to the IAEA controls, that Iran has crossed the threshold. If confidence can be developed with Iran on such a subject by seeing by oneself that the rule is respected, it will become easier to strike agreements and to build confidence on other subjects.

Borzou Daragahi: Khamenei recently described “returning to the world system” as submission to injustice.

Francois Nicoullaud:  Suspicion is on both sides.  But things change. This regime also is sensitive to its public opinion.  And the public opinion in Iran certainly favours coming to terms with the Americans.

The West vs. Iran : What Room Left for Reason? (Europe’s World, January, 2009)

Iran’s nuclear programme has provoked passions on both sides but little rational policymaking, says François Nicoullaud, France’s former ambassador to Tehran. He sets out a practical approach for lowering the political temperature on both sides

When President Barack Obama opens the files on Iran’s nuclear programme, he will find negotiations have been stalled for more than three years. He may also notice that for the past six years the voices of reason have largely been drowned out, with passions and delusions playing a considerable role on both sides. Countries sitting on their own nuclear arsenal seem to think they can order Iran about; it’s a case of “do as I say, not as I do.” Another favourite delusion in the West is to believe that Tehran will eventually surrender if the pressure is steadily increased. Anyone familiar with Iran and its regime will know that this is actually the best way to provoke a defiant response. The West is also under the illusion that Iran would again be willing to suspend uranium enrichment, even though it received nothing in return for its previous 18-month suspension. Tehran is not in the business of making submissive gestures for no reward.

But Iran, too, harbours its own set of illusions. These include the notion that it can count on support from non-Western countries, or at least from some sort of Islamic caucus. Yet at each stage in the crisis, Iran has been let down by all or most of its “friends” during head counts on various resolutions at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the UN Security Council. Tehran has also long believed that it would at some point be able to split France, and perhaps Germany away from the U.S. camp – as if these two nations would risk infuriating the Americans for the sake of an Iranian leader such as Ahmadinejad. Above all, Iran deludes itself that it can stand alone, against the whole world and at the same time develop an advanced nuclear programme which would put it in the position to “play with the big boys.” Yet by going it alone, with or without a nuclear bomb, Tehran will inevitably become marginalised and turn itself into some kind of pariah. Put another way, continued isolationism would force Iran to reinvent nuclear technologies already invented by others, no doubt with poor results.

Passions are aroused on both sides. The West feels repugnance over the moral ugliness of the Iranian regime – its cynical transgressions of human rights and hypocritical mixing of religion and politics. This is evident in the daily behaviour of Western negotiators, and our public opinion abhors the constant insults directed at Israel, the Jews and western society in general.

There is a profound conviction in the West that an Iranian regime such as this must want nuclear weapons, and that therefore the Iranians are acting accordingly. This mindset ignores the fact that Iran has been forecast to develop the Bomb for the last 20 years. People remain convinced that next year, or maybe the one after, the prediction will finally come true. Thus, insidiously, the burden of proof is overturned. German Chancellor Angela Merkel summarised the West’s position when she told the UN in 2007: “The world does not need to prove to Iran that Iran is building an atomic bomb. Iran must persuade the world that it does not want the Bomb.” This was the approach formerly used with Saddam Hussein.

Emotions are running high in Iran too, which is happy to return to its familiar role as the eternal victim in the plots of the "Great Powers". The Iranian leadership garbs itself in the mantle of Mohammad Mossadeq, the Iranian prime minister who in 1951 defied Britain and the U.S. and seized back control of his country's oil. They dream of standing at the forefront of a united Islamic community and at the forefront of the vast mass of disinherited peoples around the world. Once such high ambitions have been proclaimed, and popular ire inflamed, it is very hard for Tehran to climb down again.

In these passionate realms, reason is hard to find. From time to time, Mohammed El Baradei, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), has attempted to reintroduce it and reminded everyone that it is useless to focus on intentions, but that one must instead concentrate on capabilities. This standpoint raises practical questions about what Iran’s current capability to build an atomic bomb is, and how long it would take to produce one at the current estimated rate of progress. Would it be possible to detect in advance clandestine nuclear activity aimed at such a goal, and if so, what would Iran have to pledge in the matter of inspections and checks, and how might such pledges be obtained? Only after these topics have been exhausted and proven incapable of producing satisfactory answers would it be legitimate to use sanctions or force.

Taking these practical points further, we know Iran has made considerable progress with the centrifuge technology essential for producing the highly enriched uranium needed for nuclear weapons. It is likely that Iranian teams have at one time or another been working on the mechanics of a nuclear explosive device, at least at the blueprint stage, and the country is also openly developing a ballistic missile programme which would bring many regional capitals within the reach of a nuclear attack. Israeli cities are, of course, the obvious targets.

That said, Iran must still bring all of these programmes together, and that cannot happen undetected. Iran may be capable of producing sufficient nuclear material to make one or two bombs within the next couple of years, but such activities would inevitably be brought into the open because Iran would have either to enrich the uranium under the eyes of IAEA inspectors, or expel them before proceeding with the enrichment stage. Either way it would give the game away. And at this stage it would still need more time, at least a year and probably longer to assemble one or two crude bombs of the type used at Hiroshima. The hardest part of all would then still lie ahead, that is miniaturisation needed to fit a nuclear device into a missile head. Iran's testing to see if the whole thing works would also be easily detected, so all in all, to build a credible nuclear arsenal Iran would need around a decade and possibly longer. During all this time, it would have set itself up as a target.

We are, thank God, still a long way from this point. Nor can anyone say for sure that such a programme has even been formerly adopted by the regime, although no doubt the outlines are sketched in the mind’s eye of many of Iran’s current leaders. Other Iranian leaders are also, no doubt, carefully weighing the political and other costs of such a venture – the risks of preventive strikes from outside, Iran's increased isolation in its own region and a high-stakes regional arms race.

The dice have not, as yet, been cast. But our options are becoming more and more limited, and will continue to narrow if the West maintains its present course. It is a great pity that formal negotiations with Iran have been stalled since 2005 amid western demands that Iran suspend all of its enrichment-related activities. Three years have been wasted and we have seen no signs of suspension or of a willingness to negotiate.

Would negotiations stand any chance with Ahmadinejad as president of Iran’s Islamic Republic? The answer is clearly “no” if our objective remains that of forcing Iran to renounce all activity on centrifugation. But we in the West should face the fact that this objective was just as unattainable in the days of President Mohammad Khatami, Ahmadinejad’s reformist predecessor. The acquisition of this technology was already being paraded as a national cause back then. And there is no greater likelihood now that the West will succeed in this aim even if Ahmadinejad is replaced by a more moderate leader after the presidential elections this summer.

If we alter course, however, then there might still be a chance of making progress. For instance, if we were able to surround Iran’s nuclear activities with enough voluntarily accepted checks and controls, then the West could be confident of detecting any diversion towards military purposes in ample time. Iran could develop its programme whilst remaining a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; the IAEA would be able to carry out its role as watchdog, and perhaps confidence in Iranian intentions would slowly be restored if the country developed a coherent civil nuclear programme while respecting its international pledges.

Is this a realistic scenario? Perhaps not, but we won’t know unless we try. And how realistic are the alternatives: increasing sanctions, military strikes, perhaps war? Or will we in the West find we must surrender to the seemingly inevitable? Neither is a reassuring option. Alas, with the rational choices available to us such a narrow and difficult path, it looks much easier to take the wide highway opened by our own passions and illusions. Yet only rational behaviour by the West has any chance of eliciting a rational response from Iran.

The Iranian Nuclear File : Negotiation Can Work (March, 2007)

The deployment of the American Navy in the Gulf has reduced to a thin line indeed the distance between decision and actions of irreparable consequences. On the other end, a feeling develops in United States and in Europe that negotiation should be given at least a last chance.

People have started to realize that Iran, if only for technical reasons, is still a few years away from being able to assemble a nuclear explosive device. This assessment has been endorsed by the US Intelligence community, by the Head of the Mossad and by the Israeli Prime Minister.

People start also to realize that there is a much better chance to consolidate in the long term Iran's status as a non-military member State of the Non-Proliferation Treaty through negotiation than through the use of force.

Strangely enough, in the last months, the West has spent many more efforts to negotiate with Russia, China and others on the Iranian nuclear file than with Iran itself. Precious time has been wasted. A new negotiation should be short, intense, and success oriented. For its duration, both sides should abstain from counter-productive language and gestures. And to give the process the necessary momentum, the negotiation should be led on both sides by a high level personality, dedicated full time to its mission.

But what about the substance? Looking at what has already been said, or hinted at, an agreement can be built along the following lines.

The Western side should be able to acknowledge Iran's desire to spare its resources of fossile energy and prepare for the future. It should understand Iran's aspiration to become a relevant player in the field of advanced, future shaping, technologies.

Iran, on its part, should understand that, to be admitted in the community of responsible nuclear nations, it should abide by a set of rules and obligations, the first of which being the ratification and enforcement of the last rules adopted by IAEA, i.e. the Additional Protocol.

The Western side should also consider that no international regulation can forbid a bona fide NPT Member to explore technologies offering a direct benefit for its peaceful nuclear program, however sensitive they may be. This is the case with the technology of uranium enrichment through centrifugation. It is true that Iran has seriously violated in the past its NPT commitments. But the ratification and faithful enforcement of the Additional Protocol would demonstrate a new attitude, paving the way for a "second chance".

This is not enough. Iran, as well as any country, should also recognize that the high sensitivity of this specific technology calls for a special framework of technical and legal guarantees, placed under IAEA control :

- consistency between the development of a centrifugation capacity and the progression of the electro-nuclear program it is supposed to feed. The possession of a full-scale centrifugation capacity cannot come before the operation of a significant park of nuclear power plants,

- limitation of the rate of enrichment to the needs of a civilian program, that is at most 5%,

- swift integration of the low-enriched uranium (LEU) domestically produced into fuel components, much easier to control. As long as they could not be manufactured in Iran, Iranian LEU should be exported as soon as produced to the country, or countries, providing fuel to the Iranian reactors.

Iran should finally consider the opportunity of renouncing to develop in the foreseeable future sensitive technologies of no interest for its electro-nuclear program, such as the use of heavy water reactors and the reprocessing of spent fuel. Following such a decision, the other side should be ready to cooperate with Iran for the construction of an advanced research reactor and the corresponding research program.

On such a basis, informal contacts with Iran could open without delay. If they were positive, Iran would let know its readiness to suspend its sensitive activities for a preset, limited time, on the condition that the Security Council suspend its sanctions. The Security Council would indicate its readiness to answer positively. Suspension of sensitive activities and suspension of sanctions would be simultaneously announced on both sides. The negotiation would start immediately.

Iran : How to Come out of the Dead End (Le Monde, February, 2007)

The US would be well inspired to take into account the useful advices of Mr. El Baradei

Iran must not have the bomb. Considering the present stalemate, Mohammad El Baradei, Director General of the International Agency of Atomic Energy, Nobel Price for Peace, has suggested a way out : to put into brackets, at least for a while, our pressure and threats of sanctions, and to accept that Iran maintain, as it wishes, some centrifugation activity, but tightly limited and monitored under a specific agreement. It is true that centrifugation is a highly sensitive activity. If it escapes IAEA controls, it can be used for producing the highly enriched uranium necessary for the bomb. But if Mr. El Baradei, in his position, suggests such a formula, he must feel assured that his inspectors are able to fully control the whole process, whatever the hidden intentions of the Iranian leaders.

Mrs. Condoleezza Rice, followed by a few other Ministers of Foreign Affairs, has been scolding Mr. El Baradei, accusing him to undermine the process launched by the West to bend Iran to its will. This attitude implies strong confidence in its final success. At the moment, nothing comforts such a hope. The Iranians stubbornly stick to their points, and so do we. Without agreement, Iranian scientists and technicians progress at steady pace towards an enrichment capacity of industrial size. Once it is installed, it will be easy to tell the World that there is no other solution than to bomb Iran if we want to save peace and order in the Middle East.

Why are Mrs Rice and her partners so sure to be right against Mr. El Baradei? Not because of their personal expertise. They have other talents, but certainly not the capacity to find their way into this complex file, mixing scientific and technical data to political and strategical dimensions. Of course, they have their own experts, who whisper to them the language to hold. Are they more competent than Mr. El Baradei and his IAEA teams? This has to be proven. Those are the ones who have been predicting for twenty years that, next year, Iran would have the bomb. Who see no other solution to curb Iran's projects than forbidding it all enrichment activity, even tightly limited and controlled. Shielding in the process that no clause in the Non Proliferation Treaty allows for such a demand : certainly highly regrettable, but this is how it is. Or else, we should amend the Treaty and introduce this ban as a rule erga omnes (with a waiver for the eight or nine countries which already master the technology). Good luck to our negotiators!

Again, Iran must not have the Bomb. But the process launched in 2003 by three European countries to avoid such an outcome has not progressed, despite growing pressure within IAEA, and now from the Security Council. After almost four years of efforts, should we not give ourselves some room for introspection? The person certainly best informed in the world on the subject offers a solution. Whatever our poor appreciation of the Iranian Regime, especially of Ahmadinejad, why not give it a try? One or two months would be enough to evaluate its chances of success. And if this formula fails like the others, our experts will be in a stronger position to demonstrate that, facing Iran, the only solution left is the use of force.

A Better Issue for the Iranian Nuclear File (February, 2007)

Experts know that as long as Iran is not able to run smoothly an assembly of 2,000 to 3,000 centrifuges, there is no haste to take irreversible decisions.

President Ahmadinejad boasts that this will be done before the end of March. Thanks to the invaluable inspections of the IAEA, we know that it will take much more time, considering the technical intricacies that the Iranian engineers still have to overcome. We will perhaps assist, by mid-March, at a flamboyant inaugural ceremony in the Natanz enrichment plant, but it is more than doubtful that the annual production of the centrifuges seen on TV will come close to the equivalent of 25 kilograms of highly enriched uranium (HEU) necessary for a bomb.

And the assembling of an explosive device presents another round of technical hurdles. All in all, we can safely consider that Iran would need at least two to three years to produce a first explosion from the starting point represented by the satisfactory operation of 2,000 to 3,000 centrifuges. All of this assuming, of course, that the present regime has taken the strategic decision to become a military nuclear power, forsaking publicly or covertly its obligations under the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

But what about the existence of a clandestine enrichment program? Considering the difficulties that Iranians encounter in their visible endeavours, it is doubtful indeed that a covert program could be much more advanced. And a covert enrichment program would also have to dissimulate the whole line of upstream operations, from ore extraction and refining to the conversion of uranium in gaseous form, ready to feed the centrifuges : not an easy task either, as long as the IAEA inspectors are allowed to do their job. Overt or covert program or a mixture of the two, the minimum of two to three years from the starting point mentioned above remains by all cases valid.

We have therefore enough time to give negotiation a second, and more serious, chance. But for what, and how?

For what? The goal is clear : Iran must not have the bomb. And for this, negotiation, if successful, should produce more lasting effects than coercion.

But more precisely how? No use to list here all the reproaches we can address to Iran, simply because we have little leverage on this part of the problem. To be able to do better, we have to analyse the mistakes of the West.

·         First, the three Europeans (UK, G, F : EU3), knowing that little could be offered to Iran as long as the American sanctions could not be eased or lifted, dragged their feet from 2003 to 2005, during the whole time of the negotiation, hoping that the suspension of centrifugation activities, accepted by the Iranians as a pre-condition for talks, would evolve into a de facto renunciation. But the trick was too visible to be swallowed.

·         Second, the EU3 as well as the United States lived at each step of the process under the illusion that with a little more pressure, Iran would finally budge. They practiced a mixture of negotiation with finger pointing, threats of sanctions, and more. Agitating simultaneously carrot and stick, we ignored the importance of separating clearly the time for negotiation and the time for ultimatum.

·         Finally, the West overplayed the argument of "confidence building" as a basic prerequisite for any kind of agreement. But confidence is produced by agreements faithfully applied, and not the opposite. Furthermore, looking at several episodes of their past, the Iranians had little reason to confide in the West. Deep distrust built up on both sides.

*

Now, is it possible to escape from the spiral dive in which we seem to be trapped?

In principle yes, but only with a new strategy.

·         We can safely offer to Iran a new round of negotiations, stating clearly that it will be the negotiation "of the last chance", the failure of which would allow each party to recover its freedom of action. The negotiating time should be clearly set, six months for example. We should tell clearly the Iranians that during this time, they would be well inspired to avoid any dramatic change in their format of centrifugation activities. And any discovery in Iran of covert activities, as well as impairing IAEA inspections, would of course put the whole process to a halt. But during this time, UN sanctions should be suspended, as well as threats of harsher sanctions and of unilateral action.

·         For practical reasons, we should designate a pilot on our side, dedicated full time to the task. This is what the Iranians have done, first with Rouhani, then with Larijani. This pilot would travel to Iran and other places as much as necessary to give the negotiation the necessary momentum, and create an atmosphere of trust between the key players.

·         We should stop trying to lure Iran with offers of technological transfers, thus creating a kind of Bazaar atmosphere. These transfers will come in time, as a natural by-product of the faithful implementation of a good agreement. We should rather explain to Iran that if it wants to enter the Club of responsible nuclear Nations, it has to abide by a set of rules, the first of which being the acceptance of the so-called "Additional Protocol", which authorises intrusive inspections from IAEA. All western countries, even those with a nuclear arsenal, have signed and ratified it.

·         Here comes the last and most difficult choice : where to draw the line between acceptable nuclear activities, even in the sensitive field of centrifugation, and the unacceptable beyond?

·         Up to now, the dividing line was "zero centrifuge". It was a simple concept, and easy to sell to the general public. But it has been judged unacceptable by the Iranians, who rightly or wrongly, see it as another plot of the West to maintain its technological superiority. If we insist on this position, we must prepare ourselves to the use of force.

·         Another idea has been to offer Iran some joint venture in centrifugation, provided that production would not take place on its soil. But this creates more problems than it solves. The Iranians are not interested in a venture which would deprive them of access to the technology, and would not give them an objective assurance of timely fuel delivery for their future nuclear plants. And if the plant were to be put on Iranian soil, there would be indeed a high risk of disseminating advanced and sensitive technologies.

·         The only practical solution left is to allow Iran to maintain a research and development centrifugation activity, strictly limited in scope (no more than a few hundred centrifuges) at least as long as the country is not equipped with a significant park of nuclear power plants which could justify an domestic industrial enrichment capacity. This gives us at least a good fifteen years of tranquillity, and probably more. Furthermore, Iran should commit itself not to cross the line of 5% enrichment, enough for an industrial use. Finally, it should accept to export as soon as produced its low enriched uranium (LEU), to be incorporated for instance in the Russian fuel allotted to its Bushehr plant, and this as long as it is not able to produce its own domestic fuel components.

Basically, these three commitments (and others of lesser visibility), to be put under tight control of the IAEA, give us the guarantee that Iran, should it decide it, would not been able to rush into the fabrication of an atomic bomb without being uncovered in a matter of weeks, giving ample time for the international Community to react in full legitimacy. The Iranians have hinted in the past that a solution along these lines would be acceptable for them. The decision is now up to the West.