The Strange Case of the Grace I's Detention

On July 4, the government of Gibraltar detained in its waters a Panamian ship, the Grace I, allegedly on its way to deliver Iranian oil to a Syrian harbor. Immediately after the move, Gibraltar outlined in an official statement that the "action arose from information giving […] reasonable grounds to believe that the vessel, the Grace I, was acting in breach of European Union sanctions against Syria.” And it added: "We have reason to believe that the Grace I was carrying its shipment of crude oil to the Banyas Refinery in Syria.” One day later, the Gibraltar Supreme Court issued an order confirming that the detention of the Grace I for another 14 days was required "for the purposes of compliance with the EU Regulation 36/2012 on sanctions on Syria.”

On what grounds could a European government detain a non-European vessel transporting to Syria crude oil extracted by a non-European country, Iran?

The European Union firmly condemns the principle of secondary, or extra-territorial sanctions, widely practiced by the United States. Therefore, European prohibitions address primarily European nationals as well as persons and entities active on European territory. European law cannot prohibit a Panamanian ship from carrying what it wishes in open seas (except, of course, products targeted by international law, like drugs or undeclared nuclear materials). However, it can forbid European insurance companies from insuring a ship or its freight, it can forbid European banks from financing the venture, it can detain the ship if it stops in a European harbor, it can forbid the freight from being brought ashore. But for this, the ship itself, its freight, or its destination must be subject to European sanctions.

Obviously, the Grace I, as a ship, was not liable to European sanctions as long as it did not enter European territorial waters: Spain's or Gibraltar's. Looking at the delimitation of territorial waters in the Strait of Gibraltar, it is difficult to believe that the Grace I penetrated Gibraltar's very modest territorial waters, save for a technical stop. But, according to a further official statement from the Gibraltar Government, this is precisely what happened. Obviously, this was an ill-advised move.

What about the oil it was carrying? Following the implementation of the Vienna nuclear agreement, all European sanctions concerning Iranian oil have been lifted.

Now about the destination? Syria is clearly under European sanctions, but that does not mean that all activities and persons in Syria are subject to a European blockade. A blockade, in international law, is an act of war.

EU Regulation 36/2012, quoted by the Gibraltar Supreme Court as the legal ground for the detention, prohibits the delivery to Syria of equipment and technology that might be used for internal repression, dual-use items (nuclear material and equipment), and equipment, technology, and software of interest for military use. Four articles refer one way or another to oil. Article 6 prohibits the import, purchase, or transport of oil originating in Syria. Article 7 prohibits the sale and export of jet fuel to Syria. Articles 8 and 9 prohibit the shipment of equipment, technology, and assistance to the Syrian oil industry. There is nothing is this regulation that specifically prohibits the delivery of oil to Syria. But Chapter V—“Freezing of Funds and Economic Resources"—and its article 14 state that "no funds and economic resources" shall be made available to persons and entities listed in an Annex II. Annex II lists several oil companies and refineries, including the Baniyas Refinery Company, which the government of Gibraltar has presented as the alleged destination of the Grace I's cargo. This could be the legal ground for the detention of the ship, if indeed the sale of oil to a refinery is a way "to make available an economic resource" to it.

Iran, for its part, has denied that the Grace I was in Gibraltar's territorial waters when the UK Marines boarded it and also denied that the ship was heading to Syria. It has formally protested this "act of piracy.” Interestingly, the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs hinted that the ship's detention was provoked by a tip and a request coming from the United States.

Aside from some Iranian threats of reprisals, the case up to now has been dealt with at the legal and diplomatic levels. As long as these ways are not exhausted—and even after—Iran has no real interest in carrying out its threats to reciprocate by seizing a British tanker in the Persian Gulf. With such a move, Tehran would antagonize the European countries that, for the time being, have stayed aloof from the quarrel and certainly other countries as well.

What could be an acceptable way out for the two parties? First, let’s keep in mind that the Gibraltar jurisdictions, in order to confirm the seizure the Grace I's cargo, need documented, unquestionable evidence of its Syrian destination. Lacking such evidence, they would have no other choice than to release the ship. The crew—which apparently includes no Iranians—is presently being questioned. Given that the oil cargo in question has not reached its alleged destination, the judges could also consider that the offense has not yet been established.

All in all, there are serious grounds for releasing the Grace I, perhaps with a court injunction not to come close to Syrian shores. In that case, the ship would better avoid further risks and return to its homeport. To put an end to this strange episode, that would be a lesser evil.

(published on July 11, 2019 by the Website LobeLog)  

Rouhani's beautiful victory : what comes next?

Hassan Rouhani has undoubtedly won a brilliant victory in the presidential election, with a tally exceeding 60% of the valid votes cast in its first and only round (the 57% figure usually cited by the media included blank and invalid ballots). The result has exceeded the predictions of most experts. It provides Rouhani with a strengthened mandate to implement the campaign pledges that he already made during his first election in 2013 and that he reiterated during the latest campaign: more freedom for Iranian society and a more positive interaction with the rest of the world. These mutually reinforcing policies should lead to greater prosperity.

But this popular support won’t be enough to persuade the main pillars of the Islamic Republic—the Supreme Leader, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and the judiciary—to acquiesce in such a program. For the conservative core of the regime, Rouhani has fulfilled his historical task by concluding the Vienna nuclear agreement of 2015 and would be well advised to confine himself henceforth to the management of current affairs.

Will the incumbent president be able to escape the curse that struck his two predecessors during their second terms? Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, though supported initially by the most powerful elements of the regime, ended up at war with all his patrons and unable to take the slightest initiative. Before him, Mohammad Khatami had seen the ultra-conservative Guardian Council rescind all the progressive legislation passed by a friendly parliament. More recently, Ahmadinejad was barred from running in the last presidential election, as another former president, Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, had been in 2013. Since 2015, all Iranian media have been banned from even mentioning Khatami. In Iran, being a president of the Republic is indeed a risky proposition.

Of course, Rouhani could bet on the prompt demise of the supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, aged 77 and seriously ill, as an opportunity to reshuffle the cards of Iranian political life. But he would put himself entirely into the hands of providence. And Khamenei is almost certainly preparing the ground for two or three potential successors whose views are unlikely to differ significantly from his. Even if this succession were to come on short notice, there is no guarantee that Rouhani’s task would be made easier.

The Fights to Come

If Rouhani does not want to reach the end of his term of office discredited and rejected by his electorate, he will have to engage in some tough fights and be prepared to break some of the Islamic Republic’s most sacred crockery. Rouhani knows that internal and external openings tend to interact and that he will have to act simultaneously on both fronts. Fortunately, some steps forward, highly symbolic but also carrying tangible effects, are within his reach, whatever the formidable obstacles looming before him.

On the domestic front, for instance, the Law Commission of the Iranian parliament has already pronounced itself in favor of a draft amendment to the criminal code abolishing the death penalty for drug offenders. The adoption of such a bill by the parliament, if confirmed by the Guardian Council, would reduce the number of executions in Iran by about 90%, from at least several hundreds per year to a few dozen. Even if that would still be too many, it would mark the end of the disastrous image of Iran as the world’s first or second country for the number of executions per capita.

On the international front, two dramatic gestures would allow Iran to surprise even its most hostile adversaries and position itself as a regional trailblazer in the field of nuclear and ballistic non-proliferation.

Movement on Missiles

The first one would be to join the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). By ratifying a text that it already signed in 1996, Iran would incur no new obligations, as it has already renounced the development or acquisition of a nuclear weapon when it acceded to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. But it would set an example for its neighbors, and even beyond, as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Israel, and even the United States and China have yet to join the CTBT. At the turn of the century, Iran already authorized the CTBT Organization to install on its territory automated seismic stations designed to detect nuclear explosions. If this arrangement were reactivated, it would send an additional positive signal to the international community.

The second gesture would be for Iran to join the Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation adopted in The Hague in 2002. Iranian experts participated at the first preparatory meeting but dropped out later. In essence, this code requires its signatories to provide an annual declaration on the outline of their ballistic missile and space launch policies, disclose the number and characteristics of ballistic and space vehicles launched in the previous year, and provide advance notice of launches and test flights. In this age of worldwide satellite observation, such transparency measures would in no way jeopardize Iran’s ballistic defense decision-making autonomy. It could also exert a deterrent effect probably more effective than the usual bombastic declarations coming from Tehran on the subject.

The powerful IRGC manages the Iranian ballistic missile program, but Rouhani should be able to overcome its possible institutional resistance, much as he did in 2003 when dealing with the nuclear file. In that episode, he demonstrated that he had enough energy and political will to secure from the IRGC the cessation of some controversial nuclear activities. If he could convince the IRGC of Iran’s interest to adopt the Hague Code of Conduct , Tehran would position itself as the vanguard of its region, given that the kingdoms of the Arabic peninsula, Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, and Israel have yet to join this agreement.

The Role of Others

These possible moves by Iran should, of course, be encouraged and also reciprocated in one way or another. At the very least, the present US administration should perceive them as a signal of good will. For its part, Israel could find in such moves an indication that the “Iranian threat” could become less “existential” than before, even if Netanyahu might find it difficult to publicly admit. Saudi Arabia, which has asked repeatedly for “deeds, not words,” would thus receive an appropriate answer. And of course, the P5+1 countries that concluded the 2015 nuclear agreement with Iran—China, France, Germany, Russia, United Kingdom, United States—would bear a special collective responsibility to respond.

The last provision of the agreement’s preamble states that Iran and its six interlocutors, plus the representative of the European Union, shall meet at the ministerial level every two years, or earlier if needed. Two ministerial meetings have already taken place in New York, in September of 2015 and 2016 on the sidelines of the session of the UN General Assembly. Can we nurture the hope to see the next, and possibly fruitful, meeting in September this year?

published by the website Lobelog foreign policy, May 29, 2017

Aleppo : High Point for the Iranian Venture in Syria

Pasdar General Qasem Suleimani with Iraqi Shi'a
militias in Aleppo

For the time being, the Islamic Republic of Iran revels in the fulfilment of the “divine promise” embodied by its victory in Aleppo. The Pasdaran, or Guardians of the Revolution, have given their all for five long years. They have steadfastly supported Bashar al-Assad’s shaky army. They have mobilized and trained combat-ready auxiliary Syrian forces, imported thousands of Lebanese Hezbollah fighters and Iraqi Shia militiamen, and offered impoverished Afghans migrants work and resident permits in exchange for their deployment to Syria.

If ever it had any doubts, Iran can today take comfort in its strategic calculations. For its leadership, there was never any question of permitting some sort of neo-Taliban take power in Damascus, crush all its minorities, then cross into Lebanon and Iraq to desecrate the most sacred shrines of Shi’ism, and ultimately threaten the very borders of Iran itself. All of this with the massive support, overt or covert, of Saudi Arabia, now more than ever obsessed by the centuries-old Persian and Shi’a threat.

An Iranian Victory—of a Sort

The Iranians, however, had never harbored any illusions about Syria’s Supremo. They have criticized Bashar in half-muted tones for the ferocity of his reaction to the popular and initially peaceful revolt in 2011. They offered, at least once, to help him withdraw gracefully and settle elsewhere, but to no avail. At the same time, they regularly challenged their Western counterparts with the question, “if Bashar would leave tomorrow, who would you have take his place?” And, after a deafening silence, they would go on: “If you then leave it to a transition process, why exclude him from it? If the Syrian people, and especially the Sunni Arabs who form more than 60% of the population, hate Bashar so much, what would be the risk of letting him take his chances in an election organized by the United Nations and monitored by the International community?"

While reassured to have been on the right side in the fight against terrorism, Iran also knows that its victory is fragile. First, it has to share it with a stronger partner: Russia. Of course, it had little choice. During the summer of 2015, General Qassem Soleimani, in charge of the Pasdaran’s intervention in Iraq and Syria, had to travel to Moscow to fully detail the exhausted state of the Syrian army and focus his hosts’ attention on the prospect of seeing Bashar brushed aside on short notice. Putin lost no time in understanding the threat to the Russian military and civilian presence in the Syrian coastal cities of Latakia and Tartus.

Of course, Russia today considers itself as the one and only real winner. When preparing for the evacuation of the insurgents and the civilians still trapped in eastern Aleppo, Moscow didn’t bother to consult the Iranians and the Syrian government, and worked instead only with the Turkish intelligence units in touch with the rebels. That is why the pro-Iranian militias blocked the process, demanding the parallel evacuation of Shi’a populations trapped by insurgent factions in two towns located about thirty miles away. And Iran had to swallow another bitter pill, as it is invited by the Russians to meet in Moscow for a discussion about Syria’s future–not alone, not with the Syrian government, but with…Turkey, which has supported all kinds of jihadists in Syria since the beginning of the civil war!

After Aleppo

The Iranians know therefore all too well that the Aleppo victory is not the end of the story. The recent death of a Pasdar general in Palmyra, during the Islamic State’s recent reconquest of the city, serves as a useful reminder. If the coalition of forces supporting Assad were to reconquer all the Syrian territories that remain beyond its grasp, it would have to brace again for endless fighting. The Russians know it, too, and want to avoid falling into a new Afghanistan-like quagmire. They have reminded Assad, who still speaks of regaining control of the whole Syrian territory, that there is no military solution to the conflict. And that is probably the reason why they have arranged an honorable way for the last rebels in Aleppo to escape, instead of crushing them all in situ. Moscow is therefore pressing Assad to make concessions to the opposition and agree to an inclusive peace process, based on a national union, to defeat IS. This task by itself would already require significant new sacrifices, which could be difficult to bear for an organization like the Lebanese Hezbollah, which has already paid a heavy price in this war.

Finally, there remains a big question mark over the behavior of the future U.S. administration. Donald Trump has said that the elimination of IS would be his first priority, and that, in order to reach this goal, he would be ready to explore the possibility of finding common ground with Russia, and even with Assad. Turkey could join the endeavor if assured that the Kurds would be duly contained in the process. In such an arrangement, what place would be left to Iran? True, the Iranians are intervening in Iraq, where the Americans are also present. But in Mosul, among other places, the Iranian advisers are not as directly involved as they are in Aleppo. If the United States and Russia start acting together in Syria, Iran could be relegated to a secondary role. If not, it could at some point find itself acting as the cat’s paw of the Great Satan.

The Aleppo victory could therefore mark Iran’s high point in its Syrian venture. Its primary concern now should be to consolidate its position and remain an integral part of the solutions to come, rather than seek new conquests. All the more so, since the Iranian population already appears tired of these endless external ventures, not to mention the considerable costs in blood and treasure incurred by protecting the Syrian regime at Iran’s expense. Of course, the interventions in Syria and Iraq are presented to the public as essential in protecting Iran from terrorism, and the Iranian people generally accept that justification. But, if the euphoria over the Aleppo victory leads to grander ambitions, if it gives rise to the idea that Iran is now in a position to establish its domination over the region, it is unlikely that the public would follow.

As in most countries, the Iranian people focus on their own economic condition. Since the conclusion of the nuclear agreement in July, 2015, and the lifting of the first sanctions, they are waiting with growing impatience for the recovery of their economy, and do not want it to be compromised by unnecessary external crises. There is already plenty to do in order to ensure the survival of this agreement and the lifting of the remaining sanctions, both of which are now gravely threatened by the election of Donald Trump. This is the question on which Iranian opinion will position itself in May’s election, when President Rouhani runs for a second term. This, not Syria, is where the Iranians are expecting results.

(Published by the website "Lobelog" on December, 21 2916)

Around Laurent Fabius' visit to Tehran

interview with Shokoo Khodaie for Tehran Times (August 2, 2015)

What is the purpose of Mr. Fabius’ trip to Iran ?

 Obviously, the purpose was to start anew with the Iranian-French relationship which has been battered by the long and difficult nuclear crisis. Mr. Fabius has been very well received in Tehran and this shows that the Iranian governement is in the same state of mind. President Rouhani will go to Paris in November at the invitation of President Hollande and this will be also a very strong signal of willingness to build together again a warm and fruitful relationship. Do not forget that President Hollande was the first Western Head of State to meet President Rouhani after his election, in September 2013, on the occasion of the United Nations General Assembly, in New York. So, on the French side, the will is clearly there, and I am convinced that it is the same on Iran's side. 

What are the priorities for co-operation between the two countries ?

Most people will answer that the priority should be business, but I believe that the history of Iranian-French relations goes much beyond shere business. It is much richer than that. Business is of course important, it is a good way to build up confidence between people, but cultural and scientific cooperation, cooperation between Universities, cooperation for the protection of the environment, and of course political cooperation on all subjects of common interest are equally and perhaps  even more important. If I had the choice, I would probably choose the protection of environment as the absolute and most urgent priority.  

Apart from bilateral co-operation between the two countries, what were the most important issues discussed during this visit ? 

I believe that all the crises affecting at the present moment the Middle East, as in Iraq, Syria, Bahrain, Yemen, Lebanon, as well as the fight against extremism and terrorism, have been part of the conversations of Mr.Fabius with Mr.Zarif and President Rouhani. These are subjects in which Iran and France may have differing views, but have certainly common interests!

Is there any rivalry between France and German to penetrate the Iranian markets? 

There is certainly no rivalry between Germany and France. There is, at least in some fields, the normal and healthsome competition  which should exist in an open market between companies which have an shared interest in the Iranian market. Sometimes French and Germans work together in the same company, as in Airbus. Sometimes, French companies have no German competitors, as in the oil and gaz industry, where there is no German equivalent of Total or Institut français du Petrole. Sometimes there is indeed a competition, as between Siemens and Alstom on the public transportation market. For the benefit of the Iranians, may the best win!

French automobile companies do not have a good track record during recent years in Iran. What are their projects and plans to make up for this ?

I beg to differ with this statement. If you ask the Iranian customers, I believe that they are satisfied with the  models constructed in Iran with the cooperation of Peugeot and Renault, and consider these cars as robust, pleasant to drive, and accessible to the middle class. If you ask the Iranian manufacturers, I believe that they consider their French partners as having greatly contributed to create with them a culture of quality, of reliability, of "zero defect", of respect for the Iranian customer. And I can confirm to you that the French automakers were also deeply satisfied with their cooperation with Iran Khodro and Saipa and have developed with their Iranian counterparts solid bonds of trust and friendship. Now, it is true that American pressure and sanctions have almost completely destroyed in a few years this beautiful common venture. But it is only a matter of common will to restore it. It could be put together again in no time.

The Minister, Mr. Laurent Fabius, has been criticized for his firm stance during the nuclear talks — many Iranians perceived him to be particularly harsh. What do you expect from the Iranian side about French positions?

I can understand how the Iranians were somewhat puzzled and angered by some of Mr.Fabius' statements during this long and difficult negotiation, but I can assure you that it was never in his intention to derail the talks. He had his own vision of a "robust" agreement, but after all, the Iranians also wanted a robust agreement! It was in nobody's interest to have a weak agreement, which could have been the source of new quarrels about its interpretation and implementation. Now that all the parties are satisfied with the result,  it is time to turn the page and start a new chapter. 

What did you recommend to Mr. Fabius for this mission ?

I did not meet Mr. Fabius personally before his visit, but I have had the opportunity to express my views in several media outlets. There are two points on which I believe that France could play a useful role in the region. First by helping to bring closer two key players in the Middle East, Iran of course and also Saudi Arabia, with which France has developed recently a good relationship. If these two countries could start working together on solutions for solving the Syrian, the Iraqi, the Yemeni crises, this would be more helpful than all the American interventions! I know it is not easy, but it is not a reason not to try. The second point is a bit technical. It concerns the pending ratification by three countries in the region of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which forbids any kind of nuclear explosion. The ratification of this Treaty creates no difficulty at all for Iran. It has already signed it in 1996, and has, of  course,  no intention  whatsoever  to build a bomb. But Iran, with some good reason, says that it will not ratify it if Israel does not ratify it. Egypt is in the same position. France has good relations with Iran, Egypt and Israel. If it could slowly by slowly convince these three countries to ratify simultanuously this treaty, it would be a first step in the direction of a Nuclear Free Middle East, which is in important goal for the Iranian diplomacy.

How do you see the future of relations between Iran and France ?

Of course, we have to accept that it will take some time to rebuild a fully trusting and close relationship, but in all fields of cooperation, if we put our strengths in common, the sky is the limit!