Affichage des articles dont le libellé est France. Afficher tous les articles

Can the Iran Deal Survive a US Withdrawal?

(as published on the website Lobelog Foreign Policy on November 16th, 2016)

As we all know by now, withdrawing from the Iran nuclear deal could be a very simple matter for the United States. It could come in three ways. First, a vote by Congress to reintroduce sanctions that were previously suspended or cancelled, if not waived or vetoed by the new president, would represent a sufficiently significant breach of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) to constitute an effective withdrawal if any of the parties, including Iran, wanted to construe it as such. Second, the same outcome could be achieved if President Trump chose not to renew one or several “national interest” waivers included in U.S. sanctions legislation that President Obama used to comply with the JCPOA. Finally, on his own initiative, the new president or his secretary of state or even the White House spokesperson could merely declare that Washington was no longer bound by the JCPOA, as the agreement, after all, is no more than a common declaration of intentions adopted by consensus among the representatives of seven participant states, without the slightest signature.

We know, of course, that Donald Trump, having to face the real world, will likely be forced to renege on a good part of his promises. His declarations on Iran and the JCPOA have been outright contradictory, sometimes suggesting he will tear up the deal, at other time indicating that he intends to renegotiate its terms, and at still other times indicating that he’d prefer to end Washington’s unilateral sanctions so that U.S. business can compete for Iran’s market. But, considering the pervasive and well-established hostility of the U.S. Congress towards Iran, combined with the frame of mind of the future president’s entourage on the subject, the prospect of a chain of events leading ultimately to a US withdrawal from the JCPOA is not to be taken lightly.

Such an event by itself would not mean the end of the JCPOA, if the six other parties to the JCPOA—China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and of course Iran—decide to stand together to keep it alive. This new configuration would effectively take us back to the early 2000s, when Iran was able to trade almost normally with the outside world, with the exception of the United States. That situation was certainly not ideal for Tehran given the harsh U.S. sanctions then in place, which naturally exercised an intimidating effect on the other countries’ economic relations with Iran. But it was, all in all, far more comfortable than the almost comprehensive embargo that was gradually installed with the ramping up of the nuclear crisis in the years that followed.

Iran’s Choice

For the JCPOA to survive and to thrive “on three legs,” so to speak, a few conditions will nevertheless have to be met in the event of a U.S. withdrawal.

The first one, of course, is the decision for Iran not to use Washington’s withdrawal as a pretext to renege on its commitments, or to even try to renegotiate some of them with the remaining parties to the agreement. The most conservative and hard-line factions of the Iranian establishment will no doubt try to take advantage of the new situation to deliver the “coup de grace” to the JCPOA, which never enjoyed their support. For the “Principlists,” such an opportunity would allow them to severely undermine the popularity of President Hassan Rouhani and offer them renewed hope of regaining their hold on the Iranian society and economy.

If such an “April surprise” occurs before the presidential election scheduled for May 2017, then Rouhani’s chances for re-election would be seriously compromised. What could follow—the end of the current “moderate” experiment and the full takeover of the Iranian political institutions by the staunchest conservatives—would benefit neither the Middle East nor the world as a whole.

Europe’s Choice

The second condition is for Europe to display and maintain in the long run a clear determination in favor of the survival and continuation of the JCPOA. High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Federica Mogherini has so far made that very clear when she declared over the weekend

…Let me tell you very clearly that this is not a bilateral agreement, it is a multilateral agreement by the UN Security Council resolution. So it is in our European interest, but also in the UN interest and duty to guarantee that the agreement is implemented in full. For the whole duration of the agreement, which is 10 years. I have personally a specific role to guarantee that this is done by all sides, and for sure this is in European interest.

In the political sequence that will begin with the inauguration of the new president, at least two out of the seven parties to the agreement—China and Russia—will maintain their support for the JCPOA. Considering the uncertainties looming over Washington’s position and Iran’s reaction, Europe, with its three parties to the JCPOA—Germany, France, and the UK—could find itself in a leading role, be it in deterring the United States from leaving the JCPOA or, as a last resort, in convincing Iran to remain on board. If this time comes, will Europe rise to the occasion?

To maintain Europe’s unwavering adherence, these three European countries have a singular responsibility. In such a situation, the UK’s position would be somewhat peculiar, as it is set, in principle, to leave the EU in two to three years. The JCPOA’s continuation is obviously in the British interest, especially as Iran is a significant potential customer in terms of trade, insurance, and financial services. Will the British prime minister find in the UK’s “special relationship” with the United States sufficient arguments to dissuade Donald Trump from committing an irreversible gesture? Or, as it starts to drift away from the EU, will Britain find itself, on the contrary, more sensitive to the arguments of the new U.S. administration, more vulnerable to U.S. pressure, and therefore more prone to join Washington in withdrawing from the JCPOA? It is difficult, at the present moment, to bet on Britain’s final position.

For Germany, Iran is also a significant partner for trade and investment, as well as a long-established and reliable interlocutor in the Middle East. It will stand without doubt in support of the JCPOA. And France? Between the UK and Germany, it could find itself in the pivotal role. As in 2003 in the run-up to the Iraq war, France has shown on a number of occasions its ability to resist U.S. pressure. On the other hand, during the JCPOA negotiation, and even a while after its conclusion, Paris has hinted from time to time that it did not consider the deal to be best of all possible agreements. Since then, however, the JCPOA has proved its effectiveness in curbing the Iranian nuclear program, and the specter of a war in the Middle East triggered by the nuclear question has clearly faded away. It is thus essential that the French government, right now as well as in the form in which it emerges after the May 2017 French presidential election, expresses without ambiguity its support for the continuation of the JCPOA and engages proactively in rallying all of Europe behind it. Will it make the right choice?

Around Laurent Fabius' visit to Tehran

interview with Shokoo Khodaie for Tehran Times (August 2, 2015)

What is the purpose of Mr. Fabius’ trip to Iran ?

Obviously, the purpose was to start anew with the Iranian-French relationship which has been battered by the long and difficult nuclear crisis. Mr. Fabius has been very well received in Tehran and this shows that the Iranian governement is in the same state of mind. President Rouhani will go to Paris in November at the invitation of President Hollande and this will be also a very strong signal of willingness to build together again a warm and fruitful relationship. Do not forget that President Hollande was the first Western Head of State to meet President Rouhani after his election, in September 2013, on the occasion of the United Nations General Assembly, in New York. So, on the French side, the will is clearly there, and I am convinced that it is the same on Iran's side.

What are the priorities for co-operation between the two countries ?

Most people will answer that the priority should be business, but I believe that the history of Iranian-French relations goes much beyond shere business. It is much richer than that. Business is of course important, it is a good way to build up confidence between people, but cultural and scientific cooperation, cooperation between Universities, cooperation for the protection of the environment, and of course political cooperation on all subjects of common interest are equally and perhaps even more important. If I had the choice, I would probably choose the protection of environment as the absolute and most urgent priority.

Apart from bilateral co-operation between the two countries, what were the most important issues discussed during this visit ?

I believe that all the crises affecting at the present moment the Middle East, as in Iraq, Syria, Bahrain, Yemen, Lebanon, as well as the fight against extremism and terrorism, have been part of the conversations of Mr.Fabius with Mr.Zarif and President Rouhani. These are subjects in which Iran and France may have differing views, but have certainly common interests!

Is there any rivalry between France and German to penetrate the Iranian markets?

There is certainly no rivalry between Germany and France. There is, at least in some fields, the normal and healthsome competition which should exist in an open market between companies which have an shared interest in the Iranian market. Sometimes French and Germans work together in the same company, as in Airbus. Sometimes, French companies have no German competitors, as in the oil and gaz industry, where there is no German equivalent of Total or Institut français du Petrole. Sometimes there is indeed a competition, as between Siemens and Alstom on the public transportation market. For the benefit of the Iranians, may the best win!

French automobile companies do not have a good track record during recent years in Iran. What are their projects and plans to make up for this ?

I beg to differ with this statement. If you ask the Iranian customers, I believe that they are satisfied with the models constructed in Iran with the cooperation of Peugeot and Renault, and consider these cars as robust, pleasant to drive, and accessible to the middle class. If you ask the Iranian manufacturers, I believe that they consider their French partners as having greatly contributed to create with them a culture of quality, of reliability, of "zero defect", of respect for the Iranian customer. And I can confirm to you that the French automakers were also deeply satisfied with their cooperation with Iran Khodro and Saipa and have developed with their Iranian counterparts solid bonds of trust and friendship. Now, it is true that American pressure and sanctions have almost completely destroyed in a few years this beautiful common venture. But it is only a matter of common will to restore it. It could be put together again in no time.

The Minister, Mr. Laurent Fabius, has been criticized for his firm stance during the nuclear talks — many Iranians perceived him to be particularly harsh. What do you expect from the Iranian side about French positions?

I can understand how the Iranians were somewhat puzzled and angered by some of Mr.Fabius' statements during this long and difficult negotiation, but I can assure you that it was never in his intention to derail the talks. He had his own vision of a "robust" agreement, but after all, the Iranians also wanted a robust agreement! It was in nobody's interest to have a weak agreement, which could have been the source of new quarrels about its interpretation and implementation. Now that all the parties are satisfied with the result, it is time to turn the page and start a new chapter.

What did you recommend to Mr. Fabius for this mission ?

I did not meet Mr. Fabius personally before his visit, but I have had the opportunity to express my views in several media outlets. There are two points on which I believe that France could play a useful role in the region. First by helping to bring closer two key players in the Middle East, Iran of course and also Saudi Arabia, with which France has developed recently a good relationship. If these two countries could start working together on solutions for solving the Syrian, the Iraqi, the Yemeni crises, this would be more helpful than all the American interventions! I know it is not easy, but it is not a reason not to try. The second point is a bit technical. It concerns the pending ratification by three countries in the region of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which forbids any kind of nuclear explosion. The ratification of this Treaty creates no difficulty at all for Iran. It has already signed it in 1996, and has, of course, no intention whatsoever to build a bomb. But Iran, with some good reason, says that it will not ratify it if Israel does not ratify it. Egypt is in the same position. France has good relations with Iran, Egypt and Israel. If it could slowly by slowly convince these three countries to ratify simultanuously this treaty, it would be a first step in the direction of a Nuclear Free Middle East, which is in important goal for the Iranian diplomacy.

How do you see the future of relations between Iran and France ?

Of course, we have to accept that it will take some time to rebuild a fully trusting and close relationship, but in all fields of cooperation, if we put our strengths in common, the sky is the limit!

What if Iran were to say that it is considering withdrawing from the NPT?

The risk for failure in the ongoing nuclear negotiations with Iran has increased after the emergence of difficulties put to light in the last meetings in Oman and Vienna. The resolution of the main remaining points of contention, which concern the Iranian capacity of enrichment, and even more problematic, the timetable of the lifting of sanctions, call for daring political decisions from both parties, running counter to the positions of their respective establishments. The new majority of the American Congress, obviously eager to intervene in the process, can at any time, by adopting additional sanctions, threaten to trigger the collapse of the discussions or make it irreparable.

As the perspective of a comprehensive agreement has become more elusive, the idea has been floated of a less damaging solution, based on revolving extensions of the present provisional agreement. After all, the Joint Plan of Action adopted on November 24, 2013, offers to the United States and its partners inside the P5+1 Group (the permanent members of the Security Council, plus Germany), in exchange of modest alleviations of sanctions, an effective control over Iran’s nuclear ambitions : as long as its uranium enrichment activity remains capped at the low rate of 5% and the completion of the Arak reactor is indefinitely postponed, the two ways to the bomb (production of highly enriched uranium and production of weapon grade plutonium) are blocked for good.

But for Tehran, such a deal would mean a freeze in the development of its nuclear capacities while reducing any hopes of regaining some day its freedom of making decisions within the framework of a clear and permanent set of rules. It is therefore doubtful that Iran will wait passively until the United States makes it choice between extending again, or not, the present provisional agreement; inking, or not, a comprehensive and long-term agreement; imposing, or not, new sanctions on Iran… eventually striking, or not, the Iranian nuclear facilities.

At such a juncture, people in charge on the P5+1’s side should be careful not to entertain the illusion that they have finally cornered Iran under the pressure of sanctions, now combined to a dramatic drop in oil price. Tehran still keeps at its disposal a capacity for turning the tables. Americans and Europeans could be themselves under pressure to review their behavior if, for instance, Iran were to announce its intention to evaluate the opportunity of launching in the near future a legal procedure of withdrawal from the Treaty of Non-Proliferation.

Article X of the Treaty reads :“Each Party shall … have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country.” Iran is in a position to argue that the almost complete blockade imposed on its economy and its population in the name of a supposed “threat to peace” has all the aspects of a discriminatory and extraordinary measure deeply hurting its supreme interests. And of course, new American sanctions would only make things worse. It could underline that such a behavior directed against a fellow member of the Treaty having accepted not to acquire the bomb by members of the NPT enjoying the privilege to maintain a nuclear arsenal is indeed contrary to the spirit and the letter of the Treaty.

Iran could argue along the same lines that, whatever its past infractions to its obligations under its safeguards agreement with the International Agency for Atomic Energy (IAEA), with most of them admitted and corrected, nobody, even among the numerous inspectors of the Agency after thousands of hours of research, has been able to present any “smoking gun” pointing to the manufacturing of a nuclear explosive device and the preparation of a nuclear test. Tehran could also argue that the focus put by the P5+1 Group on the famous “breakout time” makes it clear that, in all cases, Iran still is behind he starting line of an eventual race to the bomb. As a result, it could conclude that the Security Council had no right to impose upon Iran the type of sanctions provided for by Chapter VII of the United Nations’ Charter only in response to an alleged “threat to peace” – and for some of its most prominent members, even less right to adopt on the wake of these first sanctions their own unilateral sanctions.

At the same time, Iran, in order to present itself as a responsible player, should clearly state that its withdrawal from the NPT would have no influence upon the validity of its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA and its overall commitment not to acquire the bomb. In accordance with the provisions of this agreement, Iranian nuclear material placed today under IAEA safeguards would remain submitted to exactly the same controls and inspections. New facilities such as the nuclear reactors to be built in Bushehr by the Russians would also be submitted to the same IAEA safeguards.

Within such a new legal framework, Iran, in order to escape IAEA safeguards, would need to run nuclear facilities built without external assistance, using only domestically extracted uranium and nuclear fuel produced in Iran. But to alleviate all fears and suspicions, it would be in Iran’s interest to accompany its eventual withdrawal from the NPT by a declaration stating that it would keep on abiding on a voluntary basis to the Treaty’s provisions by keeping all its nuclear material and facilities, present and future, under IAEA safeguards. Such an occurrence is not unknown in History. France, which joined the NPT only in 1992, issued in 1968 a statement at the United Nations explaining at the same time its reasons of principle for not signing the Treaty, but also its firm intention, for the sake of non-proliferation, to behave like a signatory. Of course, it would be made clear at the same time that any plan to attack Iranian nuclear facilities placed under IAEA safeguards would definitively compromise this set of commitments.

Finally, it would be important for Iran to declare that it would be ready, if it were to engage in such a venture, to rejoin the NPT the very day the UN and unilateral sanctions related to its nuclear activities were rescinded. Considering the importance of not setting a precedent undermining the coherence and the effectiveness of the Treaty, the risk of Iran’s withdrawal should force the P5+1 to face up their responsibilities as the main guardians of the NPT. Hopefully, it could have a sobering effect on the American Congress, and hasten the conclusion of the comprehensive agreement under discussion with Iran.