Iran And The U.S.: Still Possible To Escape The Worst And Work For The Best

The United States’ withdrawal from the JCPOA could certainly be considered as an ill-advised, even absurd decision, but, like it or not, could not be labelled as running counter to international law. Let us remember the care taken by the American negotiators in Vienna to avoid giving the JCPOA any formal attributes of an international treaty -- which would have required a formal approval by the Congress --. They even took care to avoid presenting it as an “agreement” not only in its title, but even in the body of the text. The document was never signed by the parties, only adopted by a silent consensus of the seven parties following a declaration by the representative of the European Union. True, the JCPOA, soon after its adoption in Vienna, has been “endorsed” by a formal resolution of the United Nations Security Council, but again the Americans, when partaking in its drafting, took great care to deprive the formula of any binding force under the United Nations Charter.

Destroying from outside the JCPOA up to the core

What happened after the withdrawal is another matter. Washington started developing an aggressive strategy against the six remaining parties aimed at destroying the JCPOA from outside. Reintroducing sanctions could have been accepted as a logical consequence of the American withdrawal as long as it did not produce direct adverse effects on the smooth implementation of the Vienna arrangement. Unfortunately, the extra-territorial dimension of most of these sanctions created a steadily growing imbalance between the Iranian nuclear commitments and their expected benefits for Iran. Though, up to now, Donald Trump’s administration had spared the inner mechanisms of the JCPOA. By threatening to forbid Tehran to send abroad the low enriched uranium and the heavy water it may produce in excess of the limits agreed in the Vienna arrangement, Washington has gone one step further. It undermines the letter and the spirit of the very core of the JCPOA.

Furthermore, in its May 3 statement, the State Department explicitly demands Iran “to stop all proliferation-sensitive activities, including uranium enrichment”. Here we return to square one, in 2003, when John Bolton, already him, was bullying the three Europeans negotiating with Iran into gaining Tehran’s submission to the famous “zero centrifuge” formula. There was of course zero chance of success, the negotiation collapsed two years later. However, it never stopped entirely and morphed into different formats until the final and decisive push given by Barack Obama and John Kerry. This last effort led to the Vienna arrangement or JCPOA, based, precisely, on the de facto recognition, within determined limits, of the Iranian enrichment program.

The collective failure of Iran’s JCPOA partners

All of this to say that the six remaining parties to the JCPOA, and not only Iran, should have felt equally attacked by the last American move. One would have liked to hear from the Europeans the word “protest” instead of the meek “regret” and “concern”. China, embroiled in a difficult negotiation with the United States, prudently called “on all relevant parties to exercise restraint etc.”. Only Russia dared to “blame” the US and to express its “understanding” of Iran’s position. An opportunity was missed by Iran’s JCPOA partners to demonstrate through a common statement their solidarity against the squarely hostile gesture from the United States. Let us hope that the next meeting of the Joint Commission provided for by the JCPOA will offer a new chance for the parties, including Iran, to speak up in one voice.

The Europeans were braver when it came to react to the Iranian answer. Putting forward their “great concern”, they urged Iran “to refrain from any escalatory steps” and rejected “any ultimatums”. By using this last term, did they intend to target Washington as well Tehran? In reality, Tehran’s “ultimatum” to progressively step up its nuclear activities absent any progress in alleviating the American sanctions reads as one of the most carefully poised and soft-spoken ultimatums in History. It rather sounds like a call for help from President Rouhani, caught between the United States and his own radical opposition.

Primum non nocere

Where can we go from now? INSTEX, the barter mechanism intended to facilitate at least the run-of-the mill trade between Iran and the European Union is yet to take off and will need no less than a year, probably more, to operate at full capacity. China is not at the present time in a position to take a bold initiative. Russia could perhaps help Iran to sell part of its oil, but this carries serious risks. All in all, no easy solution is in the offing in the two to four-month lapse of time given by Tehran to its JCPOA partners to alleviate on a priority basis sanctions on its oil exports and its banking system.

In waiting for better opportunities, the primary requirement for Iran’s partners in the JCPOA should be to defuse all risks of further tensions between them : primum non nocere. The Europeans should therefore avoid threatening to refer Iran to the Security Council for non-compliance with its commitments. The urgency for now is to save the spirit of the JCPOA, even against its letter, as long as Iran does not give rise to a significant danger of proliferation. We are still far from this point.

Of course, Iran too has to play its part. To get around the latest American decisions in the immediate future, it can down-blend to natural level the enriched uranium produced in excess that cannot be exported anymore. It can also down-blend its heavy water in excess to common water. Regardless of the JCPOA, Iran has today no interest in accumulating at great cost and efforts, using a fully outdated model of centrifuge, big stockpiles of enriched uranium of which it has no use in the short or even medium-term. It would better prepare for the future by prioritizing, within the perfectly legal framework offered by by the JCPOA, the development of its new models of centrifuges. And instead of trying to revive the uncertain construction of the natural uranium research reactor abandoned when joining the JCPOA, it should rather press its partners to help speed up the construction of the new reactor pledged in the same JCPOA, which has been desperately dragging on. This would be a positive ultimatum!

Towards a way-out of the crisis

But all of this covers only one part of the picture. The other is in Washington, where drums of crisis and war have started beating. While displaying their solidarity with all the remaining parties to the JCPOA, the Europeans, in spite of all difficulties, still have the capacity to bend the situation into a better direction. Of course, they will not convince President Trump to return to the JCPOA, nor the Iranians to renegotiate the JCPOA with the Americans. But they could capitalize on Donald Trump’s obvious longing, as seen on multiple tweets and remarks, to produce at long last proof of his “art of the deal” by striking some kind of arrangement with Tehran. All the better if it would take place before the next Presidential election. For this, a limited agreement would suffice, if it both clearly benefits the United States and reduces the Iranian risk of proliferation. This is where the Europeans could enter the game in the role of the honest broker. The first prerequisite would be to take into account the mutual distrust of the two parties. They should therefore be able to put forward equally balanced, fully voluntary and reversible gestures. The task is difficult, but not impossible

What the Americans can give

To start with the American side, a first possible gesture could be to reinstate the waivers allowing the sale to Iran of commercial passenger aircraft, as provided for by article 22 of the JCPOA. Negotiations between Iranian companies and Boeing as well as Airbus did start upon the conclusion of the Vienna arrangement. They were interrupted by the American withdrawal. All in all, they addressed the acquisition of more than two hundred planes equally spread between Boeing and Airbus. The completion of this negotiation would be, of course, highly beneficial to Iran, due to the sore state of its fleet, but also to Boeing, going through a difficult pass, and to the American economy at large. The perspective of creating thousands of jobs in the American aircraft industry would be a positive signal in an election year. Last but not least, it would also benefit the European economy.

Another possible American gesture would be to reintroduce some waivers for Iranian oil’s main clients. This would reduce tensions on the oil international market and facilitate America’s relations with its traditional friends : Japan, South Korea, Taiwan among others, without forgetting Europe. And again, reasonable gasoline prices at American pumps in an election year would be a welcome feature. A third possible gesture would be to ease the restrictions imposed on the Iranian banking sector, provided, of course, that Iran finally brings its legislation into conformity with international norms against the financing of terrorism.

What the Iranians can give

How could Iran come at par with such a bounty of gestures? Starting with the third and last point, we know that the adoption of anti-terrorism international norms currently feeds a bitter internal debate in Iran. But precisely, the perspective of an attractive package could lead to a favourable arbitration by the Supreme leader and thus settle the matter. However, this would not be enough by far, to satisfy the American side. At least another important Iranian gesture would be needed to tip the scales.

Like Edgar Poe’s letter, it is right before our eyes. As long as Iran is committed by the JCPOA provisions not to exceed a stockpile of 300 kilograms of low-enriched uranium (LEU), it has absolutely no interest in spinning the 5,000 or so centrifuges authorized by the same JCPOA. Their potential output goes far beyond this limit. 1,500 centrifuges would amply suffice to produce a couple of hundred kilograms of LEU per year. And again, the real challenge for Iran is not to run a big bunch of outdated centrifuges (the present IR1 model dates back from the early Seventies) but to be able to produce and operate efficient, up-to-date, centrifuges when the JCPOA comes to its end. There would be therefore no drawback for Iran in announcing a voluntary switch-off of about two thirds of its presently active centrifuges. All of this under the supervision of the International Agency for Atomic Energy, in return for the United States’ own commitments – and just how long as it keeps its commitments.

*

With perhaps on top of such reciprocal gestures a common understanding to envisage the reopening of a collective negotiation when the JCPOA arrives to its end, we have at hand the main elements of a fair deal both parties could be proud of : Donald Trump for having obtained much more than Barack Obama in curbing Iran’s nuclear activities without giving more than what was already contained in the JCPOA ; Rouhani for having alleviated a part of the most disruptive American sanctions while preserving the legitimacy and the future development of the Iranian nuclear program. Now, the combination of all these elements into a successful venture is the job of the diplomats. And to continue with pride, the Europeans, as we know, are rightly proud of their long diplomatic tradition. With some luck and hard work, they could be proud tomorrow for having helped defuse a serious crisis in our time.

(published on May 14, 2019, by LobeLog)

The Ups and Downs of the French-Iranian Relationship

In this edition of The Interview, Fair Observer talks to François Nicoullaud, the former French ambassador to Iran, about the ups and downs of Iran-France relations and the new US sanctions.

Kourosh Ziabari: You were the ambassador of France in Tehran for four years. How does France see its relationship with Iran? Is Iran a partner for France in the fight against terrorism, an ally, a potential threat as the Trump administration and Arab nations say, or a country with which France maintains normal diplomatic relations?

François Nicoullaud: Relations between France and the Islamic Republic have seldom been “normal.” From the zenith of the return of Khomeini to the nadir of French support for Saddam Hussein during the Iraq-Iran War and its consequences in terms of bomb attacks and hostage situations, they have gone through a kind of seesaw movement that is still ongoing. Today, President Macron is trying hard to keep the balance equal between Iran on one side and the United States and Saudi Arabia on the other side, but this looks like an almost impossible task, with the very real risk of displeasing everyone.

Ziabari: How do you evaluate your tenure as the French ambassador to Iran? How have bilateral relations developed?  

Nicoullaud: I had the luck to be posted in Iran between 2001 and 2005, exactly during the second mandate of President Khatami. This was a time of internal political opening, even if the situation was far from perfect, and also a time of mutual engagement between Iran and Europe, in which France played a crucial role. It was the French foreign minister, Dominique de Villepin, who convinced his English and German partners to go together to Tehran in order to open negotiations on the looming nuclear crisis. This common visit of three major European ministers, which took place in October 2003, was a unique event in the long history of Iran.

This first endeavor failed for several reasons after two years of efforts, but the dialogue that was then established never fully stopped. It morphed into different formats and finally led to the conclusion in 2015 of the Vienna nuclear agreement, also known as the JCPOA.

Ziabari: Why did US President Donald Trump withdraw from the Iran nuclear deal, which was the outcome of months of intense negotiations and committed diplomacy on all sides? How will Trump’s decision to pull out of the JCPOA affect US relations with Europe?

Nicoullaud: Personally, I see no rationality behind such a decision. I believe the first motive of President Trump was to destroy President Obama’s most emblematic achievement in the international field. In doing so, he has, among other consequences, offered to the Iranians a gift that they had been dreaming of for a long time without ever coming close to it: a rift between Europe and the United States on a major political issue.

Ziabari: How do the new US sanctions against the Iranians affect Iran-France trade? Since the sanctions don’t have the backing of the UN Security Council, should France feel obliged to follow them and cap its business deals with Iran?

Nicoullaud: Without any doubt, the new American sanctions seriously affect French and European trade, which had started booming right after the beginning of implementation of the nuclear agreement in January 2016. See the withdrawal of Total, Airbus, Siemens, Peugeot and Renault.

European governments and the European Union do not feel bound by such unilateral American decisions, but this is of little avail. All significant European companies have, one way or another, business interests in the US economy. The American market is obviously more attractive to them than the Iranian market. Therefore, they can be easily convinced by the US administration to abide by American laws, and eventually punished if they do not comply. And European governments, being immersed in a free-market economy, have no way to dictate their behavior to major European companies.

Ziabari: Do you think Europe is determined to preserve the JCPOA and convince Iran to remain in the deal? Or is pressure from the United States so unbearable that the JCPOA will eventually fail?

Nicoullaud: I do not question the determination of Europe to preserve the JCPOA, but the necessary tools have still to be built and put to use. No magic solution will bring back Total or Siemens to Iran. However, it should be possible to protect at least a steady flow of current trade between Europe and Iran. There are some people working hard on such a mechanism. All of this addresses complex, sensitive issues, and time is needed to produce results. In between, of course, sanctions are producing their effects, so we see a kind of race against time to establish this mechanism.

On the other hand, I strongly believe that the Iranians have no interest whatsoever in leaving the JCPOA. What would they gain by restarting producing stockpiles of enriched uranium for which they have no immediate need? By remaining faithful to their commitments, they keep the high moral ground in this quarrel, and this will present visible benefits in the long run. My guess is that most Iranians in charge are quite conscious of this point.

Ziabari: Iran’s nuclear program was just one of several sticking points between Tehran and the West, and the JCPOA was apparently the best solution. Do you think the other differences over which Iran and the international community continue to spar — including Iran’s support for militant groups in Lebanon and Palestine or its role in Syria and Yemen — can be similarly settled through diplomatic engagement?

Nicoullaud: They could eventually, but certainly not through a bilateral negotiation between Iran on one side and Western countries on the other. Such complex, multifaceted issues can only be solved through a collective engagement involving the other major regional actors. Do you remember the Madrid Conference in 1991, following the Gulf War? It failed miserably because — among other reasons — Iran was not invited, but this is the kind of format one should be thinking of at the end of the ongoing Syrian and Yemeni civil wars. The idea has already been floated for several years, but apparently the time is not ripe.

Ziabari: An issue on which Iran faces pressure is its ballistic missiles program. Shouldn’t Iran be able to develop and advance its own means of defense in the presence of several adversaries who have different visions for the future of the country, including regime change?

Nicoullaud: The JCPOA negotiators have been criticized for not having included at least the Iranian ballistic issue in their agreement. But one has to understand that such an issue could not be part of the negotiating mandate of the Iranian diplomats. The nuclear issue is a civilian matter. The challenge was to find strong enough limitations to an existing civilian program in order to stop any kind of diversion to military goals. It was therefore normal to have professional diplomats in charge of the negotiation.

But the ballistic program is a matter of defense, in the hands of the IRGC [Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps]. There could be no question of letting civilian diplomats meddle with it. To address the issue, it would have been necessary to modify in-depth the format of the negotiation. So, all in all, it was a wise decision from Iran’s partners to agree to limit the deal to the nuclear issue.

Aside from this somewhat technical point, one has to understand that a sovereign state cannot accept unilateral limitations to its defense capacity without undermining the very core of its sovereignty. This kind of surrender happens only under duress, usually after being defeated in war. Voluntary restrictions of defense capacities can only take place on a reciprocal basis — be it bilateral or, even better, multilateral. Iran is not the only country to possess ballistic missiles in the region. Any solution to the alleged threat of the Iranian missile program can only be sought at regional level in a framework of mutual concessions. It could start, for example, by a simultaneous accession of Iran and its main neighbors to The Hague Code of Conduct, which provides for a mutual effort of transparency on ballistic arsenals.

Ziabari: In 2018, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo published a set of demands that Iran should grant in order for future negotiations between Tehran and Washington to take place. He said Iran should act as a normal country to be accepted in the international community. Do you think Iran’s policies and actions are not representative of a normal country?

Nicoullaud: Iran, especially since the foundation of the Islamic Republic, is clearly not a “normal” country. But, after all, is the United States a “normal” country? Is France? Is Saudi Arabia? Is Russia? Is China? It would be interesting to hear from Mr. Pompeo his definition of a “normal country” and see what remains on the map.

Ziabari: President Trump has been heavily criticized at home and abroad for eulogizing US adversaries and alienating US allies, which is said to be the outcome of his political inexperience. How do US-France relations look like today?

Nicoullaud: The French-US relationship is going through a rather rocky path. In spite of the efforts made by President Trump and President Macron to develop strong personal relations, in spite of their reciprocal visits to Paris and to Washington, the positions of the two countries have proven to be too far apart on too many important subjects: climate, international trade, European defense and, last but not least, Iran.

(published on February 5, 2019, by the Fair Observer)

Trump, Iran, Europe: A Rebellion Of The Lambs?

As published on May 22 by the Website Lobelog

Donald Trump’s decision to pull his country out of the nuclear deal with Iran arrived with a brutality that took Europeans by surprise. Of course, in the previous days, they had lost whatever illusions they still entertained. But there was still hope for a grace period that would allow them to obtain some gestures from Iran, or sanctions eased in return for their efforts. “One more minute, Mr. Executioner,” they pleaded. But the blade of the guillotine fell nonetheless.

The US sanctions suspended by the agreement of July 2015 have now been restored in all their effects. Those who are already in business with Iran have, depending on the case, three or six months to wind down. Americans were already not permitted to trade with Iran, except in a few cases. Now, everyone is prohibited from buying, selling, or investing in Iran. But Germany has more than 100 companies established in Iran, and 10,000 which trade with it. The Italians are very present; the French have Peugeot, Renault, Total. And the European Union buys 40% of the oil exported by Iran. Airbus had just sold more than 100 planes. All of this will have to stop. 

The first European reaction was to declare this reintroduction of sanctions “unacceptable.” The second has been to explore how to counter such a decision. Two examples came to the fore. In Reagan’s day, the nine European member states successfully resisted an American attempt to prevent the construction of a gas pipeline from Siberia to Europe. In Bill Clinton’s time, the 15 member states obtained waivers from a law preventing any investment in the Iranian oil industry. In order to extract this concession, the Europeans had adopted a regulation blocking the application of this law on their territory, and the European Commission went to the World Trade Organization.

But since then, things have become more complex. The Europeans are no longer nine, or fifteen, but 28 member countries. Globalization has made immense progress. Any sizable European company has interests in the United States and is therefore subject to US law. Any even modestly complex product is likely to incorporate American parts. When those parts make up 10% or more of the total, the product falls under U.S. law. This is the case, for example, for Airbus aircraft. Moreover, at least 80% of international trade uses the dollar as currency, oil contracts in particular, which makes it also subject to US law. This is why the main European banks, hit by heavy fines, have refused, even when permitted to resume their business with Iran.

What To Do? What To Do?

To meet these challenges, several ideas, which can be combined, are circulating among the Europeans. The first is to update the 1996 regulation blocking the effect of some US laws on European territory. The principle has just been adopted at the European meeting in Sofia. It’s a welcome signal of resistance. But it won’t settle the case of companies holding interests in the United States, which will be caught in contradictory obligations. In addition, the US laws punish not only corporations, but also individuals. What business executives will take such a risk if, when setting foot in the United States, they are immediately handcuffed and presented to a judge for allegedly supporting terrorist activities?

The second idea would be to set up financial circuits that operate without the dollar. But this will take time, so ingrained are existing customs. A third would be to adopt retaliatory measures against American companies in Europe. But it would be difficult for Europeans to unanimously endorse such a principle, fraught as it is with consequences. Another idea would be to bypass the recalcitrant European banks by creating channels of public financing for business with Iran. But its realization will inevitably be complex, if it ever succeeds.

A possible silver bullet: the European Commission could sue the United States at the World Trade Organization. Unfortunately, a final decision would take a long time. In the short term, European companies have no other choice than to apply to Washington for as many waivers as possible allowing them, on a case-by-case basis, to maintain ties to Iran.

But, even supported by their governments, they are likely to be rejected. Indeed, Donald Trump is convinced that Obama wrongfully negotiated too soon with Iran, so that the wave of sanctions adopted by the United States and Europe between 2010 and 2012 had not produced its full impact. Tehran could still stand up. Reinstating the sanctions in all their harshness, Donald Trump expects to bring the Iranians to their knees in two or three years, and get everything that was denied to Obama. But the reasoning is only valid if the multiplication of waivers does not create a bounty of loopholes for the Iranians. The positions, therefore, seem irreconcilable.

Pulling Iran to the Right Side

Europeans have almost always been timid and divided in dealing with America. Now that they have a bad shepherd, will the sheep revolt? Nothing suggests so. Since the European Union has expanded to Central and Eastern Europe, its new members, having experienced the Soviet yoke, yearn above all for American protection. And they are not the only ones. Some states— Germany, France, Britain, Italy—remain sufficiently committed to the relationship with Iran to tiptoe on a tightrope between Donald Trump’s America and Hassan Rouhani’s Iran, hoping to salvage the nuclear agreement.

There is still, however, a strong initiative within reach of the Europeans to pull Iran to the right side.

Europe could offer to launch, without delay and on an equal footing, an ambitious, multifaceted partnership to fight against air pollution, protect water resources, advance agriculture and the food industry, as well as enhance and improve urban management, medicine and public health, and also academic excellence. These are all matters critical for Tehran’s sustainable development and outside the scope of US sanctions. If the initial results of such a program aroused the interest of other countries in the region, why not invite them to follow the same path?

AN EXIT FROM THE TOP IN THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR CRISIS?

(Published on October, 16, 2017 by Lobelog.com)

Despite President Trump’s demands that it do so, Iran has no intention of renegotiating the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Unless, of course, it will receive in exchange concessions that no one is likely to offer. In Tehran's internal politics, the JCPOA is a highly fragile product that has been imposed on fiercely competing factions. Why would Iran’s leadership be disposed to reopen this Pandora's box?

Yet outside Iran, a palpable frustration has been building in the absence of the hoped-for evolution in Iran’s foreign policy expected from the JCPOA’s successful implementation. Nor has the agreement produced the anticipated slowdown in Iranian ballistic-missile program. Hence, Trump’s "decertification” on the questionable grounds that Tehran is violating the “spirit” of the deal. To be fair, however, disappointment over Iran’s post-deal policies is perceptible in Europe as well.

If one believes in diplomacy, this unhealthy situation must be addressed.

Three Gestures on Non-Proliferation

On the non-proliferation front, the Islamic Republic could make in principle three positive gestures, none of which would prejudice its national interests, its basic policy positions, or its national pride. On the contrary, if combined, they would bring Iran to the highest international standard in terms of non-proliferation.

-          The first would be to ratify the Additional Protocol to its standard safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In 1993, Iran signed the Additional Protocol, which allows heightened inspections on nuclear facilities and materials, and is provisionally implementing its provisions in the framework of the JCPOA. In the same JCPOA, Iran pledged to present this Protocol to its parliament for ratification in 2023. An operative Additional Protocol is a prerequisite today for any country wishing to be recognized as the legitimate manager of a peaceful nuclear program. If Tehran is to be believed, such a recognition is exactly what Iran is pursuing. Since Iran is not gaining anything in the interim, why shouldn’t the government submit the Protocol for ratification now? After all, the current government maintains a fairly positive relationship with the present parliament, and who knows what political landscape will emerge from the 2020 parliamentary elections and the 2021 presidential elections?

·         The second gesture would be to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) that Iran signed in 1996. By acceding to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) back in 1970, Tehran has already forsaken the possibility of acquiring a nuclear arsenal. As a result, ratifying the CTBT would not impose any new obligation. It would, however, be highly symbolic as the Islamic Republic would join for the first time in its history a major international non-proliferation instrument.

·         The third gesture would be to join the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation. The Code's members agree to disclose the composition of their stockpiles of missiles, to present annually the outline of their ballistic programs, and to announce their ballistic tests in advance. At a time of comprehensive satellite monitoring of ballistic-missile activities around the world, these commitments do not jeopardize the members' freedom of action, and send a significant confidence-building signal.

A venue for regional dialogue

But why would Iran take such initiatives when it is the United States that bears the responsibility of the present crisis and President Trump relishes the "chaos" he has created? Yet perhaps there could be a way to convince Iran to give it at least a try.

Most countries in the Middle East have not yet acceded to the Additional Protocol with the IAEA, nor have they joined the CTBT or the Hague Code of Conduct. This applies in particular to major countries such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt. The invitation to all these countries to envision a simultaneous accession to these three instruments would indeed constitute an important step forward. It would moreover offer a venue for dialogue between Iran and its neighbors.

With regard to concerns about Iran’s ballistic-missile program, in particular, it would permit Tehran to put forward its quite reasonable objections to accepting unilateral commitments in the field of defense. It would also be a first response to Iran's constant appeal for the creation of a collective security system in its region. And opportunities might arise for addressing other subjects of contention in the region, notably Syria and Yemen. Of course, Israel would be missing. But as long as most of these countries, Iran in the forefront, do not recognize the State of Israel, they cannot expect it to join such an initiative.

Who, then, could launch such an endeavor? Obviously, the United States under President Trump is not in the appropriate state of mind. Could this then be an opportunity for Europe? French President Emmanuel Macron has just announced that he has spoken with Iranian President Hassan Rouhani about the possibility of paying a visit to Tehran. Such a gesture would represent a highly symbolic opening. If, at the same time, the perspective of a regional negotiation around the Additional Protocol, the CTBT, and the Hague Code of Conduct could take shape, Washington could be asked at least to encourage its friends in the Arabian Peninsula to take part and to refrain from gestures that could destabilize the process. Turkey, which is already party to these three instruments, could also help.

Of course, some voices will dismiss such an initiative as doomed to fail. But diplomacy means to never give up, to always try.

Losing an ennemy

Trita Parsi has written a great book about what remains the most outstanding diplomatic feat of the 21st century. It is the first work to describe in detail the whole course of the extraordinarily complex international negotiation that led to the conclusion in Vienna on July 14, 2015 of the now famous Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA—the arrangement between Iran and the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (China, France, Russia, UK, US), plus Germany to cap Tehran’s nuclear program in exchange for the lifting of economic sanctions against the Islamic Republic.

Even though we know the (provisional) end of the story, the book reads like a thriller, so high the tensions that built up as obstacles to an agreement repeatedly arose. This is certainly the case, among other examples, with the secret U.S.-Iranian diplomatic contacts that took place in Oman, the hectic final run of the negotiations in Vienna, and the epic battle in and around the US Congress immediately afterwards to protect the accord from its many and fierce critics.

The latest of what so far has been a trilogy of books written on the twists and turns of recent US-Iranian diplomacy, Losing an Enemy: Obama, Iran, and the Triumph of Diplomacy (Yale University Press) opens with a useful recap of the major findings in Parsi’s award-winning Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran and the United States (2010) and A Single Roll of the Dice: Obama’s Diplomacy with Iran (2012).

The first four chapters of Losing an Enemy effectively set the scene for the drama of the successful negotiation to follow. Two introductory observations provide the key drivers of the whole storyline. The first one reads: “It would be erroneous to view these negotiations and the deal they produced solely as a nuclear matter. In essence, they formed the final chapter of a thirty-five-year battle over the geopolitical order in the region in general and Iran’s place in that order in particular.” And the second: “While the deal was based on a ground-breaking scientific formula, the real challenge to the negotiations was not technical but human.” These two sentences reverberate throughout the book.

The curtain rises on the first international conflict after the end of the Cold War: the 1991 Gulf War. Parsi rightly presents it as a seminal event in the new distribution of power in the Middle East. I remember personally how, with the disappearance of the Eastern bloc, the United States and its main allies looked around for new threats capable of legitimizing the maintenance of a global military posture. Neither China nor India was sufficiently powerful to pose a credible threat. Instead, it had to come from the vaguely ominous Islamic world, and more precisely the turbulent Middle East. In Parsi’s view, Israel played a critical role in focusing Western, and especially Washington’s, attention on that region.

For its part, Israel had lost its favorite bogeyman with the defeat of Saddam Hussein, the regional leader who wanted to offer the nuclear bomb to the Arab world. At that point, Israel’s neighbors no longer posed a credible threat, as indicated by their participation in the post-war Madrid Conference under the joint presidency of the United States and a somewhat absent-minded Soviet Union (which was to disappear altogether a few weeks later). There was “a feeling in Israel that, because of the end of the Cold War, relations with the U.S. were cooling, and we needed some new glue for the alliance,” Parsi quotes one eminent Israeli scholar as telling him in one of dozens of interviews cited in the book. “The new glue was radical Islam, and Iran was radical Islam.”

Despite its helpful neutrality in the 1991 war, Iran was not invited to Madrid, a snub that constituted the first lost opportunity to draw Tehran out of its isolation and encourage it to adopt a more cooperative attitude toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. At the same time, the Israeli leadership started developing an increasingly aggressive narrative depicting Iran as an “existential threat” to the Jewish state, and indeed, to the whole civilized world. As a result, according to Parsi, hardliners in Tehran opposed to the more open policies of then-President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani gained strength, and, less than two years later, Iran forcefully rejected the Oslo agreement between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization.

The “dual-containment” policy adopted by the Clinton administration, which paired Iran with Saddam Hussein as a threat to U.S. national interests, marked the beginning of a long line of US efforts to make Iran a pariah state: politically, of course, and, more practically, through the application of comprehensive economic sanctions. Parsi digs up from the archives some emblematic declarations of the period that would become mantras under Trump more than 20 years later. There’s this nugget, for example, from Clinton’s first secretary of state, Warren Christopher: “Iran is the world’s most significant sponsor of terrorism and the most ardent opponent of the Middle East peace process…The evidence is overwhelming: Iran is intent on projecting terror and extremism across the Middle East and beyond.” Sound familiar?

September 11 and After

Then came September 11. The author describes at length Iran’s highly effective policy of active collaboration with the United States and the international coalition in their drive to break the Taliban’s hold on Afghanistan. All of this, however, was to no avail as Iran found itself included in George W. Bush’s “Axis of Evil” in his January 2002 State of Union address. With the fall of Baghdad 14 months later came talk by senior Bush officials and other Washington hardliners of “real men” wanting to go to Tehran.

In the meantime, the world discovered the budding Iranian uranium enrichment program. Three European nations, having kept their embassies in Tehran, started speaking with officials there in an attempt to negotiate a compromise guaranteeing that such a program would not end up producing nuclear weapons. In this context, a senior European official confides to Parsi that “the need for EU involvement in the nuclear issue was not so much to contain Iran, but to contain America.” Iran was spared a possible invasion, but Europe’s engagement was fated to die a slow death as Washington insisted that Iran completely abandon its enrichment project, the so-called “zero-centrifuge” or “zero-enrichment” position that would stall progress on negotiations well into the next administration.

Barack Obama chose to explicitly renounce the long-standing US policy of “regime change” regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran and engage in a negotiated solution to the nuclear crisis. But these moves in themselves were insufficient to change the course of events, according to Parsi who devotes four (of 17) chapters to describing the highly intricate games deployed by and between a broad array of actors, almost all of them holding divergent visions and interests and trying to divert Obama from his goal.

From this gallery of portraits emerges the figure of Benjamin Netanyahu, ever resourceful when it comes to raising obstacles to possible US engagement with Iran. At the same time in Tehran itself, the increasingly rancorous conflicts between Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad consistently worked against any opportunity for progress. Slowly, according to Parsi, “the political maneuverability Obama enjoyed on Iran when he first took office was completely eaten away by pressure from Israel and Congress, the fallout from the June 2009 Iranian presidential election, and Iran’s refusal to accept the Russian-American swap proposal in October 2009.” Meanwhile, the US administration’s “dual-track policy,” which combined diplomatic openings with new sanctions, proved fruitless when confronted with the steadfastness of Tehran’s negotiators and their sense that their nation was no less “exceptional” than any others, least of all the United States. The carrot-and-stick approach had its limits, particularly with a country with Iran’s history.

Finally, an Opening

Nonetheless, between the various pressures and mutual bickering that characterized the period from 2010 to 2012, Parsi highlights a range of factors that began creating opportunities for new thinking and initiatives. First, there was the gradual awareness that sanctions, however crippling for the Iranian economy and painful for Iranian society, were not impeding the advance of the nuclear program. The time was quickly approaching when Iran would have the capacity to produce enough highly enriched uranium to build one or two atomic bombs in only a few months. Second, repeated Israeli declarations, in private and public, that Iran was reaching “a point of no return” that required drastic and possibly unilateral action were not well received in Washington, to say the least. “After years of unfulfilled threats,” Parsi writes, “the White House was terrified that Netanyahu finally was about to go through with his threat to bomb Iran and pull an October surprise on Obama—right before the US presidential elections.”

Third, Obama’s election to a second term offered him renewed political space that could be translated into greater flexibility at the negotiating table. Fourth, the departure of Hillary Clinton, who definitely had little or no empathy for the Iranian file, opened the door to her replacement by Sen. John Kerry, a man whose political experience, sensitivity to the fundamental questions of war and peace, genuine warmth of personality, and personal affinities with the Middle East made him almost uniquely fit for the task at hand. Finally, the direct involvement of perhaps the most highly respected leader of the Persian Gulf and beyond, Oman’s Sultan Qaboos, provided Washington with a channel of unimpaired access to the highest levels of the Iranian government and indeed to the Supreme leader himself.

Thanks to Parsi’s thorough investigation, we have the first detailed insight into the secret meetings organized in Oman between the US and Iranian negotiators, as seen through the eyes of a number of the principals themselves. We have the date, the whereabouts, and the human environment in which William Burns, the deputy secretary of state, first introduced the ground-breaking possibility that Washington would accept an Iranian enrichment capacity. The “zero enrichment” mantra, which had up to then prevented negotiations from taking flight, was relegated to history.

The Final Push

But this by itself was still not enough. A final element for diplomacy’s success was still missing: the presence on the Iranian side of personalities with the political will and inner strength necessary to fully reciprocate the American opening. This came with the end of Ahmadinejad’s mandate and the election in May 2013 of Hassan Rouhani to the presidency. And Rouhani chose for the task the best negotiator available in Iran, a seasoned professional diplomat, Mohammad Javad Zarif. With them in place, things could start moving.

This brings us to the gripping narrative of the momentous period that began with the unprecedented phone call between the two presidents on September 27, 2013 to the JCPOA’s successful conclusion on July 14, 2015—a period filled with ups and downs, sound and fury, advances and stalemate in which the parties had to negotiate not only between themselves but, even more difficult at times, with the people in their own respective camps who were trying to derail the budding deal. For the Iranians at least, this was a strictly Iranian affair. But the Americans had to confront not only numerous and powerful opponents in Washington, but the Israelis and Saudis as well. Nor was it always easy to maintain cohesion among Washington’s five partners, according to Parsi’s exclusive account.

But the reward came with the enthusiastic welcome given to Zarif by the crowd assembled at Tehran’s airport for his return from Vienna. As for Kerry, his emotion-filled concluding remarks following those of his P5+1 colleagues were memorably captured by Parsi toward the book’s end:

Kerry spoke last. He reflected on his youth as a soldier in Vietnam and later as one of the foremost advocates against the war. How he had learned that war was the ultimate failure of mankind and that his desire to spare the younger generation what he had to endure in Vietnam was a major motivator behind his drive to resolve the nuclear issue peacefully. “It was not a prepared statement, but it [was] a sentiment I had thought a lot about during the negotiations,” Kerry told me.

“I came back from Vietnam with the deeply held belief that we should never send our men and women in uniform into harm’s way unless we’ve exhausted every other option.” At the end of Kerry’s comments, half of the other ministers were teary-eyed. No one in the room doubted that they had avoided a war that would have left all of them, and all of their countries, worse off.

The story’s final twist, of course, addresses the epic battle over the pact’s fate in the US Congress. This battle witnessed the mobilization of both sides across the country, from the grassroots to the heart of the Washington elite. Netanyahu and his supporters were defeated by overconfidence in their own influence, especially among Democratic lawmakers, and by a wide-ranging coalition of arms-control, peace, human-rights, and religious groups, former high-ranking diplomatic, military, and intelligence officials, and regional specialists allied with a determined president who hammered home the message that the alternative to the JCPOA was most likely war.

Lessons of the Crisis

A last chapter takes the form of reflection on the decade-long history of the crisis, and also on the events to come. The conclusion strikes an optimistic note in spite of all the uncertainties presently looming over the JCPOA: “The norm in recent history has been that diplomacy settles a new peace after devastating carnage—not before. Instead, a global crisis was resolved peacefully through a genuine compromise in which all sides made politically costly concessions and the outcome doesn’t just resolve the immediate nuclear question, but also has the potential to transform the relationship between Iran, the United States, and the European Union.”

Parsi continues: “The Iran negotiations stand as a progressive counterpoint to the Iraq war: opponents of militant foreign policy can now not only criticize the errors of preventive military action, but also have a successful model for peacefully reconciling nations approaching the precipice of war.”

Losing an Enemy is a beautiful book, an important book for anyone who wants to penetrate the intricacies of Middle East diplomacy and diplomacy in general. Of course, further research on this outstanding case will follow. It will go deeper into the details of some aspects such as the failed negotiation of 2009-2010 for the provision of fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor, the positioning of Washington during the Iranian democratic upheaval after the 2009 elections, or the behavior of the European partners during the negotiations. But future researchers will have no choice but to build on the foundation provided by Parsi’s eminent book.

(published by the website Lobelog on July 6, 2017)

Rouhani's beautiful victory : what comes next?

Hassan Rouhani has undoubtedly won a brilliant victory in the presidential election, with a tally exceeding 60% of the valid votes cast in its first and only round (the 57% figure usually cited by the media included blank and invalid ballots). The result has exceeded the predictions of most experts. It provides Rouhani with a strengthened mandate to implement the campaign pledges that he already made during his first election in 2013 and that he reiterated during the latest campaign: more freedom for Iranian society and a more positive interaction with the rest of the world. These mutually reinforcing policies should lead to greater prosperity.

But this popular support won’t be enough to persuade the main pillars of the Islamic Republic—the Supreme Leader, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and the judiciary—to acquiesce in such a program. For the conservative core of the regime, Rouhani has fulfilled his historical task by concluding the Vienna nuclear agreement of 2015 and would be well advised to confine himself henceforth to the management of current affairs.

Will the incumbent president be able to escape the curse that struck his two predecessors during their second terms? Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, though supported initially by the most powerful elements of the regime, ended up at war with all his patrons and unable to take the slightest initiative. Before him, Mohammad Khatami had seen the ultra-conservative Guardian Council rescind all the progressive legislation passed by a friendly parliament. More recently, Ahmadinejad was barred from running in the last presidential election, as another former president, Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, had been in 2013. Since 2015, all Iranian media have been banned from even mentioning Khatami. In Iran, being a president of the Republic is indeed a risky proposition.

Of course, Rouhani could bet on the prompt demise of the supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, aged 77 and seriously ill, as an opportunity to reshuffle the cards of Iranian political life. But he would put himself entirely into the hands of providence. And Khamenei is almost certainly preparing the ground for two or three potential successors whose views are unlikely to differ significantly from his. Even if this succession were to come on short notice, there is no guarantee that Rouhani’s task would be made easier.

The Fights to Come

If Rouhani does not want to reach the end of his term of office discredited and rejected by his electorate, he will have to engage in some tough fights and be prepared to break some of the Islamic Republic’s most sacred crockery. Rouhani knows that internal and external openings tend to interact and that he will have to act simultaneously on both fronts. Fortunately, some steps forward, highly symbolic but also carrying tangible effects, are within his reach, whatever the formidable obstacles looming before him.

On the domestic front, for instance, the Law Commission of the Iranian parliament has already pronounced itself in favor of a draft amendment to the criminal code abolishing the death penalty for drug offenders. The adoption of such a bill by the parliament, if confirmed by the Guardian Council, would reduce the number of executions in Iran by about 90%, from at least several hundreds per year to a few dozen. Even if that would still be too many, it would mark the end of the disastrous image of Iran as the world’s first or second country for the number of executions per capita.

On the international front, two dramatic gestures would allow Iran to surprise even its most hostile adversaries and position itself as a regional trailblazer in the field of nuclear and ballistic non-proliferation.

Movement on Missiles

The first one would be to join the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). By ratifying a text that it already signed in 1996, Iran would incur no new obligations, as it has already renounced the development or acquisition of a nuclear weapon when it acceded to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. But it would set an example for its neighbors, and even beyond, as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Israel, and even the United States and China have yet to join the CTBT. At the turn of the century, Iran already authorized the CTBT Organization to install on its territory automated seismic stations designed to detect nuclear explosions. If this arrangement were reactivated, it would send an additional positive signal to the international community.

The second gesture would be for Iran to join the Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation adopted in The Hague in 2002. Iranian experts participated at the first preparatory meeting but dropped out later. In essence, this code requires its signatories to provide an annual declaration on the outline of their ballistic missile and space launch policies, disclose the number and characteristics of ballistic and space vehicles launched in the previous year, and provide advance notice of launches and test flights. In this age of worldwide satellite observation, such transparency measures would in no way jeopardize Iran’s ballistic defense decision-making autonomy. It could also exert a deterrent effect probably more effective than the usual bombastic declarations coming from Tehran on the subject.

The powerful IRGC manages the Iranian ballistic missile program, but Rouhani should be able to overcome its possible institutional resistance, much as he did in 2003 when dealing with the nuclear file. In that episode, he demonstrated that he had enough energy and political will to secure from the IRGC the cessation of some controversial nuclear activities. If he could convince the IRGC of Iran’s interest to adopt the Hague Code of Conduct , Tehran would position itself as the vanguard of its region, given that the kingdoms of the Arabic peninsula, Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, and Israel have yet to join this agreement.

The Role of Others

These possible moves by Iran should, of course, be encouraged and also reciprocated in one way or another. At the very least, the present US administration should perceive them as a signal of good will. For its part, Israel could find in such moves an indication that the “Iranian threat” could become less “existential” than before, even if Netanyahu might find it difficult to publicly admit. Saudi Arabia, which has asked repeatedly for “deeds, not words,” would thus receive an appropriate answer. And of course, the P5+1 countries that concluded the 2015 nuclear agreement with Iran—China, France, Germany, Russia, United Kingdom, United States—would bear a special collective responsibility to respond.

The last provision of the agreement’s preamble states that Iran and its six interlocutors, plus the representative of the European Union, shall meet at the ministerial level every two years, or earlier if needed. Two ministerial meetings have already taken place in New York, in September of 2015 and 2016 on the sidelines of the session of the UN General Assembly. Can we nurture the hope to see the next, and possibly fruitful, meeting in September this year?

published by the website Lobelog foreign policy, May 29, 2017

The Optimistic Horizon About JCPOA Is Still There (an interview with Iran Review)

Q: In the last decade, after experiencing Sarkozy's and Hollande's quinquennium, many were convinced that there is a trend or a strategy in French foreign policy, divergent from the past when it was almost always against Iran. This belief covers a very wide spectrum, but the main concern is somehow the same as your friends' viewpoint in "Club des Vingt": Given its history and values, France should be a mediator of peace, not an interventionist or somehow a provoker of tensions. In your idea, what should be the true interpretation of French attitude toward Iran and whole MENA?

A: The French have obviously turned the page of the negotiation period relating to the JCPOA. The Iranians also, by the way, Laurent Fabius, the then-Foreign Minister, was warmly welcomed in Tehran at the end of July 2015, just a few days after the adoption of the JCPOA in Vienna. So there are no hard feelings lagging behind. It is possible that the Iranians remember that, after all, it was the French, in the person of the then-French Minister, Dominique de Villepin, who took in 2003 the initiative to open a collective negotiation with Tehran, at a time when the dominant mood in the West was rather to confront Iran. This negotiation had its ups and downs, it morphed into different formats, but it never stopped until the final result in 2015. Now, for the future, we will have in France, as you now, a new President, a new government, and a new Assembly by mid-2017. I am confident that the new teams will give a fresh look at the French policy in the Middle East. and engage in favor of progress and reconciliation in the region.

Q: Precisely, as for the elections worldwide, 2017 would be a determinant year, where people can turn the page of their destiny. What is your estimation about dynamics of presidential election in France? Do you expect that there will be a person among the candidates who will change the French strategy toward Iran and MENA? 

A: Experience shows that a country's foreign policy seldom makes in a short time a complete U turn. Whatever the next Administration, there will be elements of continuity and elements of change. We have at the present moment a very unusual presidential campaign, as one can see in the French population a pervasive feeling of distrust of the traditional parties and the old elites. But there is also a fear of overly populist endeavours, like the one advocated by Marine Le Pen. All in all, whoever the next President, I guess that there will be an evolution of the French position in the Syrian crisis, and that pragmatic considerations will take precedence over matters of principle.

Q: You accompanied the optimistic ambiance around JCPOA. The agreement was supposed to allow Iran to continue its civilian nuclear program, and pave the way for normalization of Iran's economic and diplomatic relations with the international community. How do you evaluate the proceeding? In your opinion the optimistic horizon still exists for both diplomatic and economic relations?

A: The optimistic horizon is still there  but it has visibly receded from the place and time it occupied in our original hopes. The observers, in Iran as well as abroad, realize now that it takes quite a while for the economy of a country to be redirected on the right track : in the case of Iran, it will take at least one or two more years, and not the few months that we thought about when the JCPOA was adopted. But there are encouraging signals like, among many others, the significant rise of the Iranian steel production. The same reasoning goes for the opening of international relations. One has to remember that there was a lapse of seven years between the visit of Nixon to China and the reopening of the US and Chinese embassies!

Q: Maybe an important question about JCPOA philosophy is whether it has made any change in European or global view of the Iranian position or not? You saw the future of the agreement with Iran, depending on Europeans just as much as Trump. The idea of Europeans being independent and keeping their rational distance from U.S. is brilliant, but is it a call for reuniting Europe or is it due to the importance of JCPOA? If Trump  leaves the agreement regardless of the costs, what will guarantee the continuity of the Europeans’ engagement?

A: Up to now, the European Union has demonstrated a strong attachment to the JCPOA in front of the fluctuating positions of the new US President, and this is true also of the United Kingdom, in spite of the looming Brexit. I am convinced that the firm declarations of the European countries issued in the recent months, seperately as well as as together, are playing at this very moment a significant deterring effect on the American temptation to withdraw from the JCPOA. This political pressure must be maintained, as the danger comes from the Congress as much as from the President. It must be clear for the Americans that leaving the JCPOA would open for them a big risk to find themselves isolated from the international community. This is a kind of risk that nobody, even the US, can take lightheartedly. Let us keep up with this line of conduct as each passing day without crisis reinforces the sustainability of the JCPOA.

(April 9, 2017)