Could Iran’s Exi from the Nuclear Deal Create Space for Dialogue?

Suddenly, in recent weeks, the Islamic regime in Iran has woken up in a new and uncertain environment. Long gone are the jubilation following the successful strikes in Saudi Arabia or the savoring of its spreading influence from Yemen to the Mediterranean. Its friends in Lebanon have lost to angry crowds their prestige of resistance fighters, and appear as just one of the parties to a corrupt and factional system. The Iraqi youth, undeterred by a bloody repression, manifests its categorical rejection of the heavy-handed role of Iran in Iraqi politics. And the Iranian population itself has arisen in turmoil, driving the regime to show, once more, its most ferocious face.

An enduring stalemate of the nuclear file

On the eve of a meeting in Vienna of the Joint Commission of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the situation is not brighter either with the nuclear dispute. The two strategies successively implemented by Iran to loosen the noose of the destructive United States sanctions, first a year-long “strategic patience,” then the “maximum resistance against maximum pressure,” have failed to produce the slightest result. President Donald Trump has no other tool at hand than the “crippling sanctions” to satisfy the conflicting gut feelings of his supporters: on one hand, hostility towards Iran for having deeply humiliated America during the 1979 take-over of the U.S. Embassy, and on the other hand, rejection of any perspective of another dirty war on a foreign and distant soil. And Europe has not moved either. Whatever the desire of its leaders to help Iran overcome the effects of the U.S. sanctions, they have not been able to seriously engage Iran, as the whole European economy is paralyzed by its dependence on the dollar. As a result, Iran has been being deprived of all the expected benefits of its participation to the JCPOA. And its recent policy of incremental, largely symbolic, infringements of the agreement has been unable to create the slightest positive reaction.

From all sides, the situation is in a deadlock. The French efforts to bring the U.S. and Iran to some kind of compromise seem to have subsided. There is still hope to see next year in the U.S. a political equation more favorable to Iran. But save for such a kind of miracle, the Islamic Republic is facing today a painful choice: continue bearing the deprivation and suffocation of its people, or take a game-changing initiative, such as pulling out of the JCPOA.

The benefit of a timely exit

Paradoxically, leaving the JCPOA could prove attractive, especially if implemented at the right moment, that is before the triggering of the dispute resolution mechanism enshrined in the deal. Iran would then avoid being dragged to the U.N. Security Council for non-performance of its commitments and therefore escape the fast-track procedure of reimposition of U.N. sanctions. This procedure, also known as the “snap-back” procedure, needs only one vote from one of the five permanent members of the Security Council members to reimpose the sanctions lifted with the endorsement of the JCPOA by the Security Council in July 2015. However, by its very construction, such a procedure can only be put in motion when there is a breach of commitment from a party to the JCPOA. If Iran were to quit the deal in time, there would be no more Iranian commitments, and therefore no possible breach of commitments. To make this point clearer, all parties accepted that the very day President Trump announced the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA, the United States was relieved of all its resulting obligations. What has been accepted for the U.S. has to be valid for Iran.

The dangers of withdrawal

But, at first sight, the benefits of such a decision would be short-lived indeed. First, Iran could still be dragged to the Security Council and condemned by a new resolution. However, this would have to go through the standard procedure, that is a positive vote of nine out of its fifteen members, with no negative vote of any of its five permanent members — obviously more difficult to achieve than the specific “snap-back” process. A bigger risk would be to see the United States and the Europeans reunite and impose together their own sanctions on Iran, as already done between 2010 and 2012, with painful consequences. Even worse, with the end of the JCPOA, any significant development of the Iranian nuclear program could easily be presented as a rush to the bomb. At some point, some governments, U.S., Israeli, even European, could feel entitled to react by the use of force.

Alleviating the risks

The Islamic Republic could, however, alleviate these three risks with a single formal statement, reiterating its intention to abide, henceforth on a purely voluntary basis, by all the main commitments formerly contracted in the framework of the JCPOA: maintaining under ceiling the number of its centrifuges as well as enrichment levels and low-enriched uranium stockpile; curbing the development of advanced centrifuges; confirming its intention not to develop the technology of reprocessing, and, most important, accepting the continuing implementation of the extended controls provided for by the International Atomic Energy Agency Additional Protocol.

This double move, if properly presented and implemented, should be able to deter any possible action against Iran before the Security Council, and an escalation of threats. Actually, the Iranian nuclear case would enter a wholly new landscape. And with the disappearance of the JCPOA, Donald Trump would be deprived of his main argument in his fight against “the worst agreement” ever signed by the United States.

Opportunities for dialogue

Indeed, this new environment could well prove to be more comfortable for everybody, and open new opportunities for negotiation. First, Iran would be able to modify, up or down, its new commitments, and also play on their duration, thus enlarging room for maneuver. But the other former parties to the JCPOA would also have to gain. Trump, who has consistently presented the dismantlement of the JCPOA as a prerequisite for any new deal with Iran, would be in position for some kind of opening. The Europeans, as well as the Chinese and the Russians, would be relieved of their own JCPOA commitments: no more bitter critics from Iran about their incapacity to deliver, and no more scathing remarks from the U.S. against Europe’s lack of solidarity. With the U.S. and the Europeans returning to the same page, it would become easier for them to build a common position regarding the Iranian case.

In sum, after two years of stalemate, an opportunity for a sea change could be in the offing, even if this would mean entering unknown waters. The movement could be created by Iran as well by remaining partners in the JCPOA. But Iran, being under duress, would find a stronger incentive to take an initiative combining its exit from the agreement with an offer of dialogue. And if at some point, such a dialogue could open up to other parties and other matters than the ones directly related to the nuclear file, such as the security in the Persian Gulf, all the better. After the sobering experiences through which most of the members of the region have gone through in recent times, Iran and Saudi Arabia included, the moment should be ripe for a budding spirit of compromise. Could the leaders respond, for once, to the fervent hopes of their own people?

Published December 5, 2019 on the website https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2019/12/05/could-irans-exit-from-the-nuclear-deal-create-space-for-dialogue/

The Strange Case of the Grace I's Detention

On July 4, the government of Gibraltar detained in its waters a Panamian ship, the Grace I, allegedly on its way to deliver Iranian oil to a Syrian harbor. Immediately after the move, Gibraltar outlined in an official statement that the "action arose from information giving […] reasonable grounds to believe that the vessel, the Grace I, was acting in breach of European Union sanctions against Syria.” And it added: "We have reason to believe that the Grace I was carrying its shipment of crude oil to the Banyas Refinery in Syria.” One day later, the Gibraltar Supreme Court issued an order confirming that the detention of the Grace I for another 14 days was required "for the purposes of compliance with the EU Regulation 36/2012 on sanctions on Syria.”

On what grounds could a European government detain a non-European vessel transporting to Syria crude oil extracted by a non-European country, Iran?

The European Union firmly condemns the principle of secondary, or extra-territorial sanctions, widely practiced by the United States. Therefore, European prohibitions address primarily European nationals as well as persons and entities active on European territory. European law cannot prohibit a Panamanian ship from carrying what it wishes in open seas (except, of course, products targeted by international law, like drugs or undeclared nuclear materials). However, it can forbid European insurance companies from insuring a ship or its freight, it can forbid European banks from financing the venture, it can detain the ship if it stops in a European harbor, it can forbid the freight from being brought ashore. But for this, the ship itself, its freight, or its destination must be subject to European sanctions.

Obviously, the Grace I, as a ship, was not liable to European sanctions as long as it did not enter European territorial waters: Spain's or Gibraltar's. Looking at the delimitation of territorial waters in the Strait of Gibraltar, it is difficult to believe that the Grace I penetrated Gibraltar's very modest territorial waters, save for a technical stop. But, according to a further official statement from the Gibraltar Government, this is precisely what happened. Obviously, this was an ill-advised move.

What about the oil it was carrying? Following the implementation of the Vienna nuclear agreement, all European sanctions concerning Iranian oil have been lifted.

Now about the destination? Syria is clearly under European sanctions, but that does not mean that all activities and persons in Syria are subject to a European blockade. A blockade, in international law, is an act of war.

EU Regulation 36/2012, quoted by the Gibraltar Supreme Court as the legal ground for the detention, prohibits the delivery to Syria of equipment and technology that might be used for internal repression, dual-use items (nuclear material and equipment), and equipment, technology, and software of interest for military use. Four articles refer one way or another to oil. Article 6 prohibits the import, purchase, or transport of oil originating in Syria. Article 7 prohibits the sale and export of jet fuel to Syria. Articles 8 and 9 prohibit the shipment of equipment, technology, and assistance to the Syrian oil industry. There is nothing is this regulation that specifically prohibits the delivery of oil to Syria. But Chapter V—“Freezing of Funds and Economic Resources"—and its article 14 state that "no funds and economic resources" shall be made available to persons and entities listed in an Annex II. Annex II lists several oil companies and refineries, including the Baniyas Refinery Company, which the government of Gibraltar has presented as the alleged destination of the Grace I's cargo. This could be the legal ground for the detention of the ship, if indeed the sale of oil to a refinery is a way "to make available an economic resource" to it.

Iran, for its part, has denied that the Grace I was in Gibraltar's territorial waters when the UK Marines boarded it and also denied that the ship was heading to Syria. It has formally protested this "act of piracy.” Interestingly, the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs hinted that the ship's detention was provoked by a tip and a request coming from the United States.

Aside from some Iranian threats of reprisals, the case up to now has been dealt with at the legal and diplomatic levels. As long as these ways are not exhausted—and even after—Iran has no real interest in carrying out its threats to reciprocate by seizing a British tanker in the Persian Gulf. With such a move, Tehran would antagonize the European countries that, for the time being, have stayed aloof from the quarrel and certainly other countries as well.

What could be an acceptable way out for the two parties? First, let’s keep in mind that the Gibraltar jurisdictions, in order to confirm the seizure the Grace I's cargo, need documented, unquestionable evidence of its Syrian destination. Lacking such evidence, they would have no other choice than to release the ship. The crew—which apparently includes no Iranians—is presently being questioned. Given that the oil cargo in question has not reached its alleged destination, the judges could also consider that the offense has not yet been established.

All in all, there are serious grounds for releasing the Grace I, perhaps with a court injunction not to come close to Syrian shores. In that case, the ship would better avoid further risks and return to its homeport. To put an end to this strange episode, that would be a lesser evil.

(published on July 11, 2019 by the Website LobeLog)  

Iran And The U.S.: Still Possible To Escape The Worst And Work For The Best

The United States’ withdrawal from the JCPOA could certainly be considered as an ill-advised, even absurd decision, but, like it or not, could not be labelled as running counter to international law. Let us remember the care taken by the American negotiators in Vienna to avoid giving the JCPOA any formal attributes of an international treaty -- which would have required a formal approval by the Congress --. They even took care to avoid presenting it as an “agreement” not only in its title, but even in the body of the text. The document was never signed by the parties, only adopted by a silent consensus of the seven parties following a declaration by the representative of the European Union. True, the JCPOA, soon after its adoption in Vienna, has been “endorsed” by a formal resolution of the United Nations Security Council, but again the Americans, when partaking in its drafting, took great care to deprive the formula of any binding force under the United Nations Charter.

Destroying from outside the JCPOA up to the core

What happened after the withdrawal is another matter. Washington started developing an aggressive strategy against the six remaining parties aimed at destroying the JCPOA from outside. Reintroducing sanctions could have been accepted as a logical consequence of the American withdrawal as long as it did not produce direct adverse effects on the smooth implementation of the Vienna arrangement. Unfortunately, the extra-territorial dimension of most of these sanctions created a steadily growing imbalance between the Iranian nuclear commitments and their expected benefits for Iran. Though, up to now, Donald Trump’s administration had spared the inner mechanisms of the JCPOA. By threatening to forbid Tehran to send abroad the low enriched uranium and the heavy water it may produce in excess of the limits agreed in the Vienna arrangement, Washington has gone one step further. It undermines the letter and the spirit of the very core of the JCPOA.

Furthermore, in its May 3 statement, the State Department explicitly demands Iran “to stop all proliferation-sensitive activities, including uranium enrichment”. Here we return to square one, in 2003, when John Bolton, already him, was bullying the three Europeans negotiating with Iran into gaining Tehran’s submission to the famous “zero centrifuge” formula. There was of course zero chance of success, the negotiation collapsed two years later. However, it never stopped entirely and morphed into different formats until the final and decisive push given by Barack Obama and John Kerry. This last effort led to the Vienna arrangement or JCPOA, based, precisely, on the de facto recognition, within determined limits, of the Iranian enrichment program.

The collective failure of Iran’s JCPOA partners

All of this to say that the six remaining parties to the JCPOA, and not only Iran, should have felt equally attacked by the last American move. One would have liked to hear from the Europeans the word “protest” instead of the meek “regret” and “concern”. China, embroiled in a difficult negotiation with the United States, prudently called “on all relevant parties to exercise restraint etc.”. Only Russia dared to “blame” the US and to express its “understanding” of Iran’s position. An opportunity was missed by Iran’s JCPOA partners to demonstrate through a common statement their solidarity against the squarely hostile gesture from the United States. Let us hope that the next meeting of the Joint Commission provided for by the JCPOA will offer a new chance for the parties, including Iran, to speak up in one voice.

The Europeans were braver when it came to react to the Iranian answer. Putting forward their “great concern”, they urged Iran “to refrain from any escalatory steps” and rejected “any ultimatums”. By using this last term, did they intend to target Washington as well Tehran? In reality, Tehran’s “ultimatum” to progressively step up its nuclear activities absent any progress in alleviating the American sanctions reads as one of the most carefully poised and soft-spoken ultimatums in History. It rather sounds like a call for help from President Rouhani, caught between the United States and his own radical opposition.

Primum non nocere

Where can we go from now? INSTEX, the barter mechanism intended to facilitate at least the run-of-the mill trade between Iran and the European Union is yet to take off and will need no less than a year, probably more, to operate at full capacity. China is not at the present time in a position to take a bold initiative. Russia could perhaps help Iran to sell part of its oil, but this carries serious risks. All in all, no easy solution is in the offing in the two to four-month lapse of time given by Tehran to its JCPOA partners to alleviate on a priority basis sanctions on its oil exports and its banking system.

In waiting for better opportunities, the primary requirement for Iran’s partners in the JCPOA should be to defuse all risks of further tensions between them : primum non nocere. The Europeans should therefore avoid threatening to refer Iran to the Security Council for non-compliance with its commitments. The urgency for now is to save the spirit of the JCPOA, even against its letter, as long as Iran does not give rise to a significant danger of proliferation. We are still far from this point.

Of course, Iran too has to play its part. To get around the latest American decisions in the immediate future, it can down-blend to natural level the enriched uranium produced in excess that cannot be exported anymore. It can also down-blend its heavy water in excess to common water. Regardless of the JCPOA, Iran has today no interest in accumulating at great cost and efforts, using a fully outdated model of centrifuge, big stockpiles of enriched uranium of which it has no use in the short or even medium-term. It would better prepare for the future by prioritizing, within the perfectly legal framework offered by by the JCPOA, the development of its new models of centrifuges. And instead of trying to revive the uncertain construction of the natural uranium research reactor abandoned when joining the JCPOA, it should rather press its partners to help speed up the construction of the new reactor pledged in the same JCPOA, which has been desperately dragging on. This would be a positive ultimatum!

Towards a way-out of the crisis

But all of this covers only one part of the picture. The other is in Washington, where drums of crisis and war have started beating. While displaying their solidarity with all the remaining parties to the JCPOA, the Europeans, in spite of all difficulties, still have the capacity to bend the situation into a better direction. Of course, they will not convince President Trump to return to the JCPOA, nor the Iranians to renegotiate the JCPOA with the Americans. But they could capitalize on Donald Trump’s obvious longing, as seen on multiple tweets and remarks, to produce at long last proof of his “art of the deal” by striking some kind of arrangement with Tehran. All the better if it would take place before the next Presidential election. For this, a limited agreement would suffice, if it both clearly benefits the United States and reduces the Iranian risk of proliferation. This is where the Europeans could enter the game in the role of the honest broker. The first prerequisite would be to take into account the mutual distrust of the two parties. They should therefore be able to put forward equally balanced, fully voluntary and reversible gestures. The task is difficult, but not impossible

What the Americans can give

To start with the American side, a first possible gesture could be to reinstate the waivers allowing the sale to Iran of commercial passenger aircraft, as provided for by article 22 of the JCPOA. Negotiations between Iranian companies and Boeing as well as Airbus did start upon the conclusion of the Vienna arrangement. They were interrupted by the American withdrawal. All in all, they addressed the acquisition of more than two hundred planes equally spread between Boeing and Airbus. The completion of this negotiation would be, of course, highly beneficial to Iran, due to the sore state of its fleet, but also to Boeing, going through a difficult pass, and to the American economy at large. The perspective of creating thousands of jobs in the American aircraft industry would be a positive signal in an election year. Last but not least, it would also benefit the European economy.

Another possible American gesture would be to reintroduce some waivers for Iranian oil’s main clients. This would reduce tensions on the oil international market and facilitate America’s relations with its traditional friends : Japan, South Korea, Taiwan among others, without forgetting Europe. And again, reasonable gasoline prices at American pumps in an election year would be a welcome feature. A third possible gesture would be to ease the restrictions imposed on the Iranian banking sector, provided, of course, that Iran finally brings its legislation into conformity with international norms against the financing of terrorism.

What the Iranians can give

How could Iran come at par with such a bounty of gestures? Starting with the third and last point, we know that the adoption of anti-terrorism international norms currently feeds a bitter internal debate in Iran. But precisely, the perspective of an attractive package could lead to a favourable arbitration by the Supreme leader and thus settle the matter. However, this would not be enough by far, to satisfy the American side. At least another important Iranian gesture would be needed to tip the scales.

Like Edgar Poe’s letter, it is right before our eyes. As long as Iran is committed by the JCPOA provisions not to exceed a stockpile of 300 kilograms of low-enriched uranium (LEU), it has absolutely no interest in spinning the 5,000 or so centrifuges authorized by the same JCPOA. Their potential output goes far beyond this limit. 1,500 centrifuges would amply suffice to produce a couple of hundred kilograms of LEU per year. And again, the real challenge for Iran is not to run a big bunch of outdated centrifuges (the present IR1 model dates back from the early Seventies) but to be able to produce and operate efficient, up-to-date, centrifuges when the JCPOA comes to its end. There would be therefore no drawback for Iran in announcing a voluntary switch-off of about two thirds of its presently active centrifuges. All of this under the supervision of the International Agency for Atomic Energy, in return for the United States’ own commitments – and just how long as it keeps its commitments.

*

With perhaps on top of such reciprocal gestures a common understanding to envisage the reopening of a collective negotiation when the JCPOA arrives to its end, we have at hand the main elements of a fair deal both parties could be proud of : Donald Trump for having obtained much more than Barack Obama in curbing Iran’s nuclear activities without giving more than what was already contained in the JCPOA ; Rouhani for having alleviated a part of the most disruptive American sanctions while preserving the legitimacy and the future development of the Iranian nuclear program. Now, the combination of all these elements into a successful venture is the job of the diplomats. And to continue with pride, the Europeans, as we know, are rightly proud of their long diplomatic tradition. With some luck and hard work, they could be proud tomorrow for having helped defuse a serious crisis in our time.

(published on May 14, 2019, by LobeLog)

The Ups and Downs of the French-Iranian Relationship

In this edition of The Interview, Fair Observer talks to François Nicoullaud, the former French ambassador to Iran, about the ups and downs of Iran-France relations and the new US sanctions.

Kourosh Ziabari: You were the ambassador of France in Tehran for four years. How does France see its relationship with Iran? Is Iran a partner for France in the fight against terrorism, an ally, a potential threat as the Trump administration and Arab nations say, or a country with which France maintains normal diplomatic relations?

François Nicoullaud: Relations between France and the Islamic Republic have seldom been “normal.” From the zenith of the return of Khomeini to the nadir of French support for Saddam Hussein during the Iraq-Iran War and its consequences in terms of bomb attacks and hostage situations, they have gone through a kind of seesaw movement that is still ongoing. Today, President Macron is trying hard to keep the balance equal between Iran on one side and the United States and Saudi Arabia on the other side, but this looks like an almost impossible task, with the very real risk of displeasing everyone.

Ziabari: How do you evaluate your tenure as the French ambassador to Iran? How have bilateral relations developed?  

Nicoullaud: I had the luck to be posted in Iran between 2001 and 2005, exactly during the second mandate of President Khatami. This was a time of internal political opening, even if the situation was far from perfect, and also a time of mutual engagement between Iran and Europe, in which France played a crucial role. It was the French foreign minister, Dominique de Villepin, who convinced his English and German partners to go together to Tehran in order to open negotiations on the looming nuclear crisis. This common visit of three major European ministers, which took place in October 2003, was a unique event in the long history of Iran.

This first endeavor failed for several reasons after two years of efforts, but the dialogue that was then established never fully stopped. It morphed into different formats and finally led to the conclusion in 2015 of the Vienna nuclear agreement, also known as the JCPOA.

Ziabari: Why did US President Donald Trump withdraw from the Iran nuclear deal, which was the outcome of months of intense negotiations and committed diplomacy on all sides? How will Trump’s decision to pull out of the JCPOA affect US relations with Europe?

Nicoullaud: Personally, I see no rationality behind such a decision. I believe the first motive of President Trump was to destroy President Obama’s most emblematic achievement in the international field. In doing so, he has, among other consequences, offered to the Iranians a gift that they had been dreaming of for a long time without ever coming close to it: a rift between Europe and the United States on a major political issue.

Ziabari: How do the new US sanctions against the Iranians affect Iran-France trade? Since the sanctions don’t have the backing of the UN Security Council, should France feel obliged to follow them and cap its business deals with Iran?

Nicoullaud: Without any doubt, the new American sanctions seriously affect French and European trade, which had started booming right after the beginning of implementation of the nuclear agreement in January 2016. See the withdrawal of Total, Airbus, Siemens, Peugeot and Renault.

European governments and the European Union do not feel bound by such unilateral American decisions, but this is of little avail. All significant European companies have, one way or another, business interests in the US economy. The American market is obviously more attractive to them than the Iranian market. Therefore, they can be easily convinced by the US administration to abide by American laws, and eventually punished if they do not comply. And European governments, being immersed in a free-market economy, have no way to dictate their behavior to major European companies.

Ziabari: Do you think Europe is determined to preserve the JCPOA and convince Iran to remain in the deal? Or is pressure from the United States so unbearable that the JCPOA will eventually fail?

Nicoullaud: I do not question the determination of Europe to preserve the JCPOA, but the necessary tools have still to be built and put to use. No magic solution will bring back Total or Siemens to Iran. However, it should be possible to protect at least a steady flow of current trade between Europe and Iran. There are some people working hard on such a mechanism. All of this addresses complex, sensitive issues, and time is needed to produce results. In between, of course, sanctions are producing their effects, so we see a kind of race against time to establish this mechanism.

On the other hand, I strongly believe that the Iranians have no interest whatsoever in leaving the JCPOA. What would they gain by restarting producing stockpiles of enriched uranium for which they have no immediate need? By remaining faithful to their commitments, they keep the high moral ground in this quarrel, and this will present visible benefits in the long run. My guess is that most Iranians in charge are quite conscious of this point.

Ziabari: Iran’s nuclear program was just one of several sticking points between Tehran and the West, and the JCPOA was apparently the best solution. Do you think the other differences over which Iran and the international community continue to spar — including Iran’s support for militant groups in Lebanon and Palestine or its role in Syria and Yemen — can be similarly settled through diplomatic engagement?

Nicoullaud: They could eventually, but certainly not through a bilateral negotiation between Iran on one side and Western countries on the other. Such complex, multifaceted issues can only be solved through a collective engagement involving the other major regional actors. Do you remember the Madrid Conference in 1991, following the Gulf War? It failed miserably because — among other reasons — Iran was not invited, but this is the kind of format one should be thinking of at the end of the ongoing Syrian and Yemeni civil wars. The idea has already been floated for several years, but apparently the time is not ripe.

Ziabari: An issue on which Iran faces pressure is its ballistic missiles program. Shouldn’t Iran be able to develop and advance its own means of defense in the presence of several adversaries who have different visions for the future of the country, including regime change?

Nicoullaud: The JCPOA negotiators have been criticized for not having included at least the Iranian ballistic issue in their agreement. But one has to understand that such an issue could not be part of the negotiating mandate of the Iranian diplomats. The nuclear issue is a civilian matter. The challenge was to find strong enough limitations to an existing civilian program in order to stop any kind of diversion to military goals. It was therefore normal to have professional diplomats in charge of the negotiation.

But the ballistic program is a matter of defense, in the hands of the IRGC [Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps]. There could be no question of letting civilian diplomats meddle with it. To address the issue, it would have been necessary to modify in-depth the format of the negotiation. So, all in all, it was a wise decision from Iran’s partners to agree to limit the deal to the nuclear issue.

Aside from this somewhat technical point, one has to understand that a sovereign state cannot accept unilateral limitations to its defense capacity without undermining the very core of its sovereignty. This kind of surrender happens only under duress, usually after being defeated in war. Voluntary restrictions of defense capacities can only take place on a reciprocal basis — be it bilateral or, even better, multilateral. Iran is not the only country to possess ballistic missiles in the region. Any solution to the alleged threat of the Iranian missile program can only be sought at regional level in a framework of mutual concessions. It could start, for example, by a simultaneous accession of Iran and its main neighbors to The Hague Code of Conduct, which provides for a mutual effort of transparency on ballistic arsenals.

Ziabari: In 2018, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo published a set of demands that Iran should grant in order for future negotiations between Tehran and Washington to take place. He said Iran should act as a normal country to be accepted in the international community. Do you think Iran’s policies and actions are not representative of a normal country?

Nicoullaud: Iran, especially since the foundation of the Islamic Republic, is clearly not a “normal” country. But, after all, is the United States a “normal” country? Is France? Is Saudi Arabia? Is Russia? Is China? It would be interesting to hear from Mr. Pompeo his definition of a “normal country” and see what remains on the map.

Ziabari: President Trump has been heavily criticized at home and abroad for eulogizing US adversaries and alienating US allies, which is said to be the outcome of his political inexperience. How do US-France relations look like today?

Nicoullaud: The French-US relationship is going through a rather rocky path. In spite of the efforts made by President Trump and President Macron to develop strong personal relations, in spite of their reciprocal visits to Paris and to Washington, the positions of the two countries have proven to be too far apart on too many important subjects: climate, international trade, European defense and, last but not least, Iran.

(published on February 5, 2019, by the Fair Observer)

Trump, Iran, Europe: A Rebellion Of The Lambs?

As published on May 22 by the Website Lobelog

Donald Trump’s decision to pull his country out of the nuclear deal with Iran arrived with a brutality that took Europeans by surprise. Of course, in the previous days, they had lost whatever illusions they still entertained. But there was still hope for a grace period that would allow them to obtain some gestures from Iran, or sanctions eased in return for their efforts. “One more minute, Mr. Executioner,” they pleaded. But the blade of the guillotine fell nonetheless.

The US sanctions suspended by the agreement of July 2015 have now been restored in all their effects. Those who are already in business with Iran have, depending on the case, three or six months to wind down. Americans were already not permitted to trade with Iran, except in a few cases. Now, everyone is prohibited from buying, selling, or investing in Iran. But Germany has more than 100 companies established in Iran, and 10,000 which trade with it. The Italians are very present; the French have Peugeot, Renault, Total. And the European Union buys 40% of the oil exported by Iran. Airbus had just sold more than 100 planes. All of this will have to stop. 

The first European reaction was to declare this reintroduction of sanctions “unacceptable.” The second has been to explore how to counter such a decision. Two examples came to the fore. In Reagan’s day, the nine European member states successfully resisted an American attempt to prevent the construction of a gas pipeline from Siberia to Europe. In Bill Clinton’s time, the 15 member states obtained waivers from a law preventing any investment in the Iranian oil industry. In order to extract this concession, the Europeans had adopted a regulation blocking the application of this law on their territory, and the European Commission went to the World Trade Organization.

But since then, things have become more complex. The Europeans are no longer nine, or fifteen, but 28 member countries. Globalization has made immense progress. Any sizable European company has interests in the United States and is therefore subject to US law. Any even modestly complex product is likely to incorporate American parts. When those parts make up 10% or more of the total, the product falls under U.S. law. This is the case, for example, for Airbus aircraft. Moreover, at least 80% of international trade uses the dollar as currency, oil contracts in particular, which makes it also subject to US law. This is why the main European banks, hit by heavy fines, have refused, even when permitted to resume their business with Iran.

What To Do? What To Do?

To meet these challenges, several ideas, which can be combined, are circulating among the Europeans. The first is to update the 1996 regulation blocking the effect of some US laws on European territory. The principle has just been adopted at the European meeting in Sofia. It’s a welcome signal of resistance. But it won’t settle the case of companies holding interests in the United States, which will be caught in contradictory obligations. In addition, the US laws punish not only corporations, but also individuals. What business executives will take such a risk if, when setting foot in the United States, they are immediately handcuffed and presented to a judge for allegedly supporting terrorist activities?

The second idea would be to set up financial circuits that operate without the dollar. But this will take time, so ingrained are existing customs. A third would be to adopt retaliatory measures against American companies in Europe. But it would be difficult for Europeans to unanimously endorse such a principle, fraught as it is with consequences. Another idea would be to bypass the recalcitrant European banks by creating channels of public financing for business with Iran. But its realization will inevitably be complex, if it ever succeeds.

A possible silver bullet: the European Commission could sue the United States at the World Trade Organization. Unfortunately, a final decision would take a long time. In the short term, European companies have no other choice than to apply to Washington for as many waivers as possible allowing them, on a case-by-case basis, to maintain ties to Iran.

But, even supported by their governments, they are likely to be rejected. Indeed, Donald Trump is convinced that Obama wrongfully negotiated too soon with Iran, so that the wave of sanctions adopted by the United States and Europe between 2010 and 2012 had not produced its full impact. Tehran could still stand up. Reinstating the sanctions in all their harshness, Donald Trump expects to bring the Iranians to their knees in two or three years, and get everything that was denied to Obama. But the reasoning is only valid if the multiplication of waivers does not create a bounty of loopholes for the Iranians. The positions, therefore, seem irreconcilable.

Pulling Iran to the Right Side

Europeans have almost always been timid and divided in dealing with America. Now that they have a bad shepherd, will the sheep revolt? Nothing suggests so. Since the European Union has expanded to Central and Eastern Europe, its new members, having experienced the Soviet yoke, yearn above all for American protection. And they are not the only ones. Some states— Germany, France, Britain, Italy—remain sufficiently committed to the relationship with Iran to tiptoe on a tightrope between Donald Trump’s America and Hassan Rouhani’s Iran, hoping to salvage the nuclear agreement.

There is still, however, a strong initiative within reach of the Europeans to pull Iran to the right side.

Europe could offer to launch, without delay and on an equal footing, an ambitious, multifaceted partnership to fight against air pollution, protect water resources, advance agriculture and the food industry, as well as enhance and improve urban management, medicine and public health, and also academic excellence. These are all matters critical for Tehran’s sustainable development and outside the scope of US sanctions. If the initial results of such a program aroused the interest of other countries in the region, why not invite them to follow the same path?