With the whirlwind of meetings and declarations in which the newly
elected Iranian president has embarked during his visit in New York, we have
attended a kind of wild week, crowned by the historical telephone call between
Obama and Rouhani. But the euphoria created by the visible thaw between Iran
and the outer world having now somehow subsided, we have to admit that this
whole set of events remained within the realm of declarations of good
intentions. There is still to get to the heart of the matters, and therefore to
the heart of the nuclear file.
And there, Rouhani needs a quick success. He has been elected on the
promise that he would loosen the noose of sanctions which strangles the Iranian
population. At this juncture, the Americans and the Europeans hold his fate in
their hands. Either one sees good progress in the negotiation, the sanctions are
reduced, the economy rebounds. In that case, Rouhani’s popularity strengthens,
and he gets the upper hand within the Islamic republic’s system in order to address
Iran’s other disputes with the outer world. Or the negotiation drags on, the
Iranian economy falls deeper into depression, popular disappointment sets in. Conservative
factions, defeated in the presidential election but still powerful in the
parliament and in the inner core of the regime, regain courage, and engage in
guerilla against the government. Rouhani being weakened, Iran enters anew a
course of confrontation against its familiar adversaries: the West, Israel, the
Arab kingdoms…
In order to help Rouhani demonstrate that he has made the right choice when
betting on openness and engagement, one gesture is needed : to recognize Iran’s
right to enrichment. In exchange of what Tehran is ready to give all necessary
guarantees to alleviate the world’s worries : enhanced international controls,
enrichment capped at 5%. This percentage is sufficient for industrial uses, but
at comfortable distance from the 90% necessary for a nuclear explosive device.
We are still far from this point. As Obama himself recalled at the
United Nations, Americans and Europeans maintain their demand that Iran
comply with the Security Council requirements, which means suspending its
enrichment activities. Such a demand is unacceptable for Iran, as we have known
since it has been adopted in 2006. Rouhani himself said it a little while after
his election. When he was negotiating on the nuclear file between 2003 and 2005,
he accepted a first suspension, gaining nothing in exchange. He has been
bitterly criticized by his opponents for such a move, and the critics have not
subsided. To order again such a suspension would be for him a political
suicide.
By convincing the Security Council to adopt a decision of limited
interest, except for pressuring Iran into the termination of its enrichment
activities, we have fallen into our own trap. In its resolution, the Council expressed
the conviction that such a suspension would contribute to a negotiated
solution. But this requirement, by hindering the progress of the negotiation, has
produced the opposite effect. Time has come to admit it. And more broadly, it
is not serious to ask Rouhani, as it has often been heard, to make the “first
steps“ without disclosing what we would be willing to offer in exchange. No
political leader anywhere in the world would accept to make a significant
concession without being able to present to his public the corresponding
benefits. Let us hope that this consideration of common sense will be kept in
mind during the forthcoming negotiations. To achieve some progress, “first
steps” have to come from both sides, and be simultaneous.
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